A HIDDEN STATUTORY BAR TO PRIVATE CAUSES OF
ACTION FOR BREACHES OF THE WTO’S AGREEMENT
ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
MAJOR DANIEL E. SCHOENI, USAF*

“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.”
- Attributed to Mark Twain1

ABSTRACT
Liberalizing public procurement is free trade’s final frontier.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is the
largest free-trade agreement under negotiation. Talks will not
progress without reaching an agreement on public procurement.
U.S. law contains a hidden bar to the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement’s (GPA) challenge
procedures. This statutory bar could be a deal breaker for TTIP
negotiations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Liberalizing public procurement is free trade’s final frontier.
With the breakdown of the Doha Round in 2008, bilateral and
regional agreements have become the favored means to advance
free-trade measures. Perhaps foremost among such agreements is
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”),2 the
trade agreement being negotiated between the European Union and
the United States, which was unveiled at President Obama’s 2013
State of the Union address.
TTIP has enormous potential because of its scale; the EU and
America account for nearly half of global GDP. The hope is that
TTIP may serve as a catalyst for European and American economies
and, in turn, may reignite a world economy still faltering from the
global financial crisis of 2007-08.3 Much is at stake.
One component of TTIP is the liberalization of public
procurement; in other words, countries opening the market for their
governments’ purchases of goods and services to foreign
competition. Particularly important to the EU is gaining greater
access to the United States’ sub-central procurement markets. So
important is this that negotiations may be stalled if an agreement
cannot be reached. Indeed, the failure to extend coverage to subcentral procurement markets could be a deal breaker.
In discussing these points, some may feel a sense of déjà vu, as a
similar melodrama played out during negotiations over the World
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement
(“GPA”) in 1993-94. In that instance, talks were acrimonious; a small
2 This is sometimes abbreviated with a hyphen (“T-TIP”) and sometimes
without. Unless quoting a source using the former punctuation, this article will not
hyphenate.
3 See, e.g., Ben Leubsdorf, Hiring Settles into Steady Gains, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2,
2014, at A1 (noting that, despite signs of recovery, “[m]any scars from the financial
crisis remain”); The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7,
2013, at 74 (arguing that, even years later, the “effects of the financial crisis are still
being felt”); Why Not to Expect Recovery Anytime Soon, ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/09/financial-crisis
(explaining why a financial-crisis recession tends to last longer than a businesscycle recession).
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trade war ensued, and utter failure was only narrowly avoided.
Similar issues were again in play during the discussions for the
Revised GPA. It is remarkable how similar the issues are today, in
this third attempt, are to the negotiations that were conducted ten
and twenty years ago. Then, as now, the EU demanded greater
access to the United States’ sub-central markets. Then, as now, many
state, local, and municipal governments resisted granting such
access to European suppliers. “It’s déjà vu all over again.”4
In 1993, the EU and the United States fought obstinately for
concessions to secure the necessary domestic support for an
agreement on government procurement. Tense battles were fought
over inches. Ultimately, they reached an agreement giving both
sides cause to celebrate. Yet, perhaps unknowingly, Europe got less
than it bargained for.
The GPA established minimum standards, and signatories were
supposed to enact legislation implementing these standards.
Among the minimum standards was the requirement that members
were to provide a forum in which firms could challenge breaches of
the GPA.5 This article presents a little-known fact: Congress never
passed a law implementing private enforcement. It did just the
opposite. Congress flouted the GPA, barring firms from seeking
redress under the GPA at federal or sub-federal levels. Under the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), only the U.S. federal
government may do so.6 Congress thereby created an insuperable
bar to such challenges.7
4 THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 58 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (attributing this
quotation to Lawrence Peter “Yogi” Berra).
5 See infra note 16, GPA, Art. XX.2, (requiring that members “provide nondiscriminatory, timely, transparent and effective procedures enabling suppliers to
challenge alleged breaches of the [GPA] arising in the context of procurements in
which they have, or have had, an interest”).
6 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (limiting enforcement powers to “[n]o person other
than the United States”); see also infra text accompanying notes 237–250 (detailing
how the URAA bars private causes of action under the GPA).
7 This was little known, but was not unknown. See, e.g., Matt Schaefer, Are
Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for International Trade Agreements to
Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-Federal Governments?, 17 NW. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 609, 639 (1997) (explaining that the URAA follows NAFTA’s
implementing legislation approach and “prohibits private causes of action”);
Charles Tiefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and
Practice, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 31, 44–46 (1997) (noting and explaining the statutory bar
on private causes of action under the URAA barely one year after its passage);
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Fragile political support for TTIP within the EU makes
genuinely reciprocal access to U.S. procurement markets crucial.
The fact that the United States does not provide a forum in which to
directly challenge GPA violations will not gratify the EU
constituents – who will no doubt maintain that meaningful access to
U.S. procurement markets requires private recourse to such forums.
This issue may seem inconsequential. Yet it has the potential to
derail TTIP negotiations because access to procurement markets –
more precisely meaningful access – entails the right to a private cause
of action and remedies to enforce those rights. Rising awareness
that the United States chose not to provide for these rights in its
implementation of the WTO GPA could affect current TTIP
negotiations. What for now may seem merely theoretical could soon
be at the front and center of TTIP negotiations.
This article will proceed as follows: Section II describes freetrade initiatives since the Cold War, the breakdown of the Doha
Round, the growth of regional and bilateral agreements, and the
“revolution” in public procurement; Section III explains the history
leading up to the GPA’s creation, the membership and accession
process, and – most importantly to this article – the enforcement
mechanisms. It concludes with a synopsis of the Revised GPA.
Section IV describes the statutory bar to private litigation, explains
how this may affect TTIP negotiations, and suggests that the United
States should consider eliminating this bar.
2. BACKGROUND
This section provides the context necessary to grasp the
interactions among the GPA, TTIP, and trade negotiations between
the United States and the European Union. Subsection A gives an
overview of multilateral free-trade negotiations over the past two
decades. Subsection B describes the transition from multilateral to
bilateral and regional trade agreements after the failure of the Doha
Round negotiations. Subsection C introduces TTIP. Subsection D
Christopher Yukins, Barriers to International Trade in Procurement after the Economic
Crisis–Part II : Opening International Procurement Markets: Unfinished Business, in
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS YEAR IN REVIEW CONFERENCE COVERING 2010 BRIEFS 4
(2011) (noting that Government Accountability Office precedent has not “squarely
addressed” the question about whether it can enforce the GPA).
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summarizes the efforts to liberalize government procurement
markets and the significance of these efforts. This sets the stage for
Section III, which covers multilateral agreements’ recent success
with liberalizing public procurement.
2.1. Free-Trade Efforts Since the Cold War
Modern free-trade agreements commenced with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) negotiations in 1947.8
Concerns about the trade wars that, in turn, caused the “collapse of
international trade in the 1930s” and, many held, ultimately the
outbreak of World War II, “led some world leaders to conclude that
new international economic institutions were essential.”9
Recognizing the significance of government purchases, the United
States proposed including government procurement in the broader
liberalization agenda.10 Yet given the political sensitivities, that was
not to be. Government procurement was excluded from the GATT
treaty.11
8 See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 188.
9 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT & THE WTO 21 (2000)
[hereinafter JACKSON]; see also ALLEN B. GREEN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT LAW 86-87 (2011) (explaining that “a global economic view tending
towards free in developed countries took hold as the world sought to recover from
the destruction [of World War II] and to prevent future occurrences of such
calamity”).
10 See Gabrielle Marceau & Annet Blank, History of the Government Procurement
Negotiations Since 1945, 4 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 77, 77 (1996) (recounting the
United States’ initial proposal that procurement “be treated as any other measure[]
relating to trade in goods and be subject to the general non-discrimination
obligations of [n]ational [t]reatment”).
11 Sue Arrowsmith, Reviewing the GPA:
The Role and Development of the
Plurilateral Agreement after Doha, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 761, 762 (2002) [hereinafter
Arrowsmith (2002)] (explaining that due to “its sensitive nature, government
procurement was largely excluded from the non-discrimination obligations of
GATT 1947”); Jean H. Grier, Recent Developments in International Trade Agreements
Covering Government Procurement, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 385, 387 (2006) (noting that
“government procurement was expressly excluded from the national treatment
obligation”); Alan Kashdan, Government Procurement, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 555 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996)((explaining that far
from upholding national treatment, “the right of countries to discriminate against
non-domestic suppliers in their public procurements was even explicitly enshrined”
in the GATT) (emphasis added)).
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Successive negotiations continued with the Tokyo Round (197379)12 and Uruguay Round (1986-94).13 In 1995, GATT was
transformed into the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),14 whose
purpose was to “raise global living standards by eliminating
barriers to international trade.”15 The Uruguay Round included a
parallel discussion that led to the creation of the Agreement on
Government Procurement16 (“GPA”).17
The GPA is perhaps the most important manifestation of the
“global revolution” in government procurement.18 Sue Arrowsmith
lists several factors giving rise to this revolution,19 and suggests that
its most “significant feature” is “the liberalisation of international
procurement markets.”20 She attributes this liberalization to a
12 JACKSON, supra note 9, at 52 (recounting that the Tokyo Round made
“extraordinary” progress because “for the first time important attention was given
to nontariff barriers as well as to tariffs.”).
13 Id. at 399-413 (describing the creation of the WTO during the Uruguay
Round).
14 Id. at 400.
15 SUE ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO 25, n.3 (2003)
[hereinafter ARROWSMITH (2003)] (citing the preamble to the treaty creating the
WTO).
16 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 4(b), Agreement on
Government Procurement, available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf [hereinafter GPA].
17 The literature on this subject sometimes refers to the Agreement on
Government Procurement as the AGP and at other times as the GPA. This article
uses the latter abbreviation for 1994 agreement. Further, an eponymous agreement
under the Tokyo Round of the GATT is abbreviated at AGP. To avoid confusion,
this Article will refer to the Uruguay Round procurement agreement as the GPA
and the Tokyo Round procurement agreement as the AGP, infra note 71.
18 SUSAN L. ARROWSMITH, JOHN LINARELLI & DON WALLACE, JR., REGULATING
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 15 (2000)
[hereinafter ARROWSMITH, ET AL.] (quoting Don Wallace, Jr., The Changing World of
National Procurement Systems: Global Reformation, 4 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 57
(1995)).
19 Id. at 15–17 (listing among these: the fall of communism, the emergence of
market economies, the role of development banks, and the use of model
procurement codes); see also Christopher Yukins & Steven L. Schooner,
Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38
GEO. J. OF INT'L L. 529, 529–30 (2007) [hereinafter Yukins & Schooner] (observing that
“[a]fter centuries of isolationism, the world’s public procurement markets are
emerging as a progressively integrated, open market.”).
20 ARROWSMITH, ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
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growing awareness “that overall economic welfare as well as the
welfare of individual states is, in general, maximized by the
operation of free international competition in their economies,
rather than by each state protecting its own domestic industry.”21
She also advocates the continued application of free trade to
government procurement:
This free competition should ideally extend to government
procurement as well as to private markets. This entails that
governments should not discriminate in their procurement in
favour of domestic industry, but should purchase from the
source offering the best value, regardless of the nationality of the
contractor or the origin of the goods or services. To promote
international competition in public procurement, various
arrangements have been concluded under which states promise
to open up their procurement markets to other signatories.22
The GPA is no mere corollary to free-trade initiatives. Initially,
negotiations focused on the “most obvious barriers, notably import
duties (tariff barriers) and quotas.”23 More recently, however,
“attention has increasingly turned towards more subtle barriers,” as
the success of free-trade agreements has driven trade barriers into
the shadows and led nations to employ “less obvious methods.”24
One non-tariff barrier is “[d]iscrimination in public procurement,”25
and efforts to eliminate such barriers “may be the most important
and vice versa:
development[s] in procurement today,”26
liberalization of public procurement is among the most important
initiatives of free trade.

21 Id. at 157. Arrowsmith later contrasts governments in the past that “have
tended to…. support domestic industry in general or to promote strategic economic
objectives such as regional development” with “modern policy makers [who] have
come increasingly to accept liberal trade theories which eschew protectionism and
dictate that overall welfare will increase if there is free competition in international
trade.”
22 Id. at 17.
23 Id. at 157.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Yukins & Schooner, supra note 19, at 530.
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2.2 Post-Doha: The Flowering of Regional Trade Agreements
In 2001, the Doha Round of the WTO negotiations ensued. Like
the negotiations that preceded it, the Doha Round’s goal was to
eliminate trade barriers and facilitate trade.27 Negotiations faltered
in 200328 and stalled entirely in 2008 when an agreement could not
be reached on tariffs, other barriers, and remedies.29 The divide was
between industrialized nations and developing nations.30 All hope
is not lost,31 but many now favor other less contentious venues to
promote free trade.32
Working alongside the WTO are regional and bilateral trade
agreements that liberalize trade on a piecemeal basis.33 By their
nature, these are “limited in scope and cannot create a truly
27 See generally Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General
Council on August 1, 2004, WT/L/579.
28 See, e.g., Cancun Collapse, Wash. Post, Sep. 16, 2003, at A18 (recounting the
2003 dispute over reducing subsidies in rich countries and protecting foreign
investments in poor countries).
29 See, e.g., The Doha Round . . . and Round . . . .and Round, ECONOMIST, Jul.
31, 2008 (attributing the breakdown of talks in Geneva to a stalemate over
agricultural subsidies in the rich world).
30 See, e.g., John W. Miller, Global Trade Talks Fail as New Giants Flex Muscle,
Wall St. J., Jul. 30, 2008, at A1 (discussing the negotiations breakdown between the
EU and U.S. and “rising titans such as China and India”).
31 There was a glimmer of hope with the signing of the Bali declaration on
December 7, 2013. See Bali Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(13)/DEC, WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION
(11
Dec.,
2013)
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/
balipackage_e.htm (simplifying customs procedures); Life After Doha, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 14, 2013 (writing that “reports, including some by this newspaper, of the death
of Doha have proved to be greatly exaggerated.”); See also Dead Man Talking,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2011, at 81 (describing rich countries’ renewed interest in the
developing world, which were forecasted to account for “75% of the addition to
world GDP between 2011 and 2014,” as grounds for “salvaging” the Doha Round
talks).
32 See, e.g., In My Backyard, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2013 (writing that over the past
decade, regional trade “increasingly looked like an alternative, not a complement,
to multilateralism”); Partners and Rivals, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2012, at 52 (discussing
several pending trade agreements in Asia).
33 See Yukins & Schooner, supra note 19, at 563 n.113 (cataloguing the literature
on several of the regional and bilateral free trade agreements).
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international open procurement market.”34 However, for many,
since the Doha Round, these agreements have become the “tool of
choice” for removing trade barriers.35
In addition to bilateral trade deals negotiated while the Doha
Round was still faltering,36 the United States has entered into several
bilateral agreements since the Doha Round fell apart,37 and has two
major trade deals currently under negotiation.38 The United States
Id. at 563.
Allen B. Green & Marques O. Peterson, Converging Procurement Systems–Part
II: International Trade and Public Procurement 2013 Update, in WEST GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS YEAR IN REVIEW: CONFERENCE BRIEFS 1-11 (2014) (listing new agreements
between Switzerland and China and the EU and Singapore, and negotiations
between China and Australia and the EU and Japan); see also Some Progress on
Bilateral Trade Deals as Doha Remains Stalled, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Aug. 1,
2012),
https://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=wt&articleId=
809043065&secId=2 (reporting that “in the absence of progress on the multilateral
Doha round of trade negotiations, countries have turned to smaller and more
focused deals”); In the Absence of a Global Accord Countries Are Striking Bilateral Deals,
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Dec. 12, 2012), https://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?
articleType=wt&articleId=1419935926&secId=3 (describing the United States’
efforts “to further bilateral trade agreements with [countries in] Asia and Latin
America”).
36 See, e.g., Grappling with Globalisation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2004, at S14-S15
(reporting that the U.S. entered into free trade agreements with 12 countries during
President George W. Bush’s first term, including: Australia, Morocco, Bahrain,
Chile, Singapore, and Jordan).
37 Completed agreements include Panama, Colombia, and South Korea. See
Randal Archibald, Bursts of Economic Growth in Panama Have Yet to Banish Old
Ghosts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at A18 (discussing Panama’s changing political
and financial climate prior to the US-Panama free-trade agreement); Carnation
Revolution, Colombia’s Free Trade Deal, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2012 (analyzing the
impact of the US-Colombia free-trade agreement on Colombia’s domestic
industries); William McGurn, Presidential Seoul-Searching, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2011,
at A13 (contrasting President Obama’s conflicting international and domestic
priorities in the US-Korea free-trade agreement). There is also work afoot to
revitalize existing free-trade agreements. E.g., Ready to Take Off Again?, ECONOMIST,
Jan 4., 2014, at 23 ((describing President Obama’s trip to Mexico in May 2013, when
he touted that the U.S. exports more to NAFTA than to the BRIC countries
combined (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, and China); and the potential for reform)).
38 In addition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
trade deal that is under negotiation with the EU, which is discussed in detail below,
the U.S. is actively engaged in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) with 11
countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan, with the possibility of Korea and China also
subsequently joining this free-trade zone. See Korea, China Likely to Join US-led TransPacific Trade Pact, BUSINESS KOREA (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.businesskorea.
co.kr/news/politics/2316-tpp-vs-rcep-korea-china-likely-join-us-led-trans34
35
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is not alone.39 Bilateral and regional agreements have proliferated
to such a degree that some economists fret that they are distorting
trade flows.40

2.3. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Perhaps foremost among the regional free trade agreements
under negotiation is TTIP41 between the EU and the United States.
It is significant, not least because of its scale. The EU and the United
States “have the largest economic relationship in the world” and a
“[c]ombined [GDP of] … over $15 trillion… equating to half of the

pacific-trade-pact (characterizing Korea’s decision as a shift “from a cautious
attitude to willingness to join it”).
39 In 2013 alone, several trade agreements were finalized or negotiated. The
EU entered a free-trade agreement with Singapore and continued talks with Japan.
See European Commission Press Release Database, The EU-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement (Sept. 20, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13805_en.htm (reporting that the EU and Singapore have offered terms in line with or
beyond those available to “comparable trading partners”); European Union Press
Release Database, The Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Japan (June 17, 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-572_en.htm (predicting EUJapan exports to rise by 32.7%, and Japan-EU exports to rise by 23.5%). China and
Switzerland also finalized an agreement. See REUTERS, China, Switzerland Sign Free
Trade Agreement (July 6, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/07/06/us-china-trade-idUSBRE96503E20130706
(reporting
“a
comprehensive and mutually beneficial pact that should contribute to increased
trade between the two economies”). China and Australia’s negotiations are
ongoing. See Who Resurrected the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement?, THE
DIPLOMAT (Nov. 20, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/who-resurrectedthe-china-australia-free-trade-agreement/ (describing a string of comments by
both Chinese and Australian officials about re-opening negotiations between
nations). South Korea alone has entered into nine trade agreements in the past
decade. See Corporate Armistice, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2013 (outlining trade
agreements in light of Korea’s history of domestic growth through monopolistic
conglomerates called “chaebols”).
40 See, e.g., Least Favoured Nation, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 2006 (describing the perils
of each of the WTO’s 149 members entering into bilateral trade deals with one
another for a total 11,026 bilateral deals) (citing Richard Baldwin, Multilateralising
Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12545, 2006)).
41 This is sometimes abbreviated as T-TIP, sometimes as TTIP. This article will
use the latter abbreviation except when quoting from sources using the former.
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world’s output.”42 With imports of $458 billion in 2012, the EU is the
United States’ largest export market.43
Size matters. Though tariffs between the United States and EU
are already relatively low,44 TTIP still promises large returns “given
the magnitude of the transatlantic relationship.”45 Even a free-trade
agreement limited to just tariffs, which are 3.5% in the United States
and 5.3% in the EU,46 could amount to “[d]ynamic welfare gains” of
$168 billion per year.47 With trade flows this large, even minor gains
have the potential to yield tremendous benefits.48 It is no wonder
that TTIP is “welcomed by the business communities on both sides
of the Atlantic.”49

42 Green & Peterson, supra note 35, at 1–12 (citing Business Coalition for
Transatlantic Trade, Economic Benefits of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership,
http://www.transatlantictrade.org/faqs/economic-benefits-of-atransatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2015)); see also
Anne Gearan, Kerry Urges Quick Action on U.S.-European Free-Trade Deal, WASH.
POST, Mar. 28, 2013, at A9 (reporting that if TTIP is successful, EU-U.S. exchanges
would grow to 40% of total world trade).
43 White House, Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jun. 17, 2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/
2013/june/wh-ttip (touting $3.7 trillion in reciprocal investments and 13 million
jobs).
44 Charlemagne: Ships That Pass in the Night, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2014, at 57
(explaining that “TTIP focuses on regulatory and other non-tariff barriers, because
levies on most products traded across the Atlantic are already close to zero
(exceptions include running shoes and fancy chocolate.)”).
45 Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Cong. Research Serv., R43158, Proposed Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): In Brief Summary (2013).
46 Id. at 6.
47 Id. (estimating direct U.S. and EU welfare gains at $7.5 billion, as well as a
range of “[d]ynamic welfare gains” from $117 to $168 billion) (citing FREDRIK
ERIXON AND MATTHIAS BAUER, A TRANSATLANTIC ZERO AGREEMENT: ESTIMATING THE
GAINS FROM TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE IN GOODS, European Center for
International Political Economy, ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 4/2010 (2010)).
48 Business Coalition, supra note 42 (estimating that if TTIP is implemented,
exports would be “$150 billion higher, our economies some $250 billion bigger, and
we would generate an additional 500,000 high-paying jobs”); ECONOMIST, supra note
44, at 57 (noting that “potential benefits are hard to estimate, but one reasonable
guess is that an ‘ambitious’ TTIP could raise America’s GDP by 0.4% and the EU’s
by slightly more.”).
49 Lucas Bergkam & Lawrence Kogan, Trade, the Precautionary Principle, and
Post-Modern Regulatory Process, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 493, 493 (2013) (citations
omitted).
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Further, while EU-U.S. tariffs are low in absolute terms, the
United States is one of the few countries subjected to the EU’s
highest tariffs.50 So not only is TTIP mutually beneficial, the United
States also stands to benefit disproportionately from eliminating the
outsized tariffs that the EU imposes. Indeed, when President
Obama announced TTIP negotiations at his 2013 State of the Union
address, he touted it would “support millions of good-paying
American jobs.”51
Yet eliminating non-tariff barriers is far more important than a
marginal decrease in tariffs.52 As one study reports, “[b]ecause
transatlantic tariff barriers are generally quite low and EU and US
companies are deeply interlinked and invest heavily in each other’s
countries,” the various forms of non-tariff barriers “are far more
important impediments to greater transatlantic trade and
investment flows than tariffs.”53 Here lies the greatest potential
furthering free trade.

50 See Hans H. Stein, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership:
Transatlantic Relations Reloaded, FREIHEIT (Jun. 2, 2013),
http://www.en.freiheit.org/The-Transatlantic-Trade-and-InvestmentPartnership-Transatlantic-Relations-Reloaded/1322c27170i1p/index.html (which
notes that although between the US and EU, the “[t]ariff barriers are at an average
of 3-5%. . . which is low[,]” for certain types of goods there are extremely high
“tariff peaks[;]” such as 20% for agricultural related products).
51 John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 650, 692 (2013) ((citing Press Release, White
House, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-presidentstate-union-address)).
52 A recent study prepared for the European Commission suggested that
eliminating non-tariff barriers is probably more important to transatlantic trade
negotiations than reducing tariffs. See JOSEPH FRANCOIS, ET AL., REDUCING
TRANSATLANTIC BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 95 (2013), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf (“[The]
core message . . . is that a focus on [non-tariff barriers] is critical to the logic of
transatlantic liberalization”).
53 KOEN G. BERDEN, ET AL., NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN EU-US TRADE AND
INVESTMENT
– AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
xvii
(2009),
available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc_145613.pdf (presenting a study prepared by
ECORYS on behalf of the European Commission).
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Among the market sectors with the highest barriers to trade is
government procurement.54 Such barriers are familiar to students
of U.S. procurement practices.55 The EU complains that these
barriers result is access to only 32% of U.S. procurement markets.56
Hence, there are “large potential benefits” from reducing these nontariff barriers.57
2.4. Liberalizing Procurement: Free Trade’s Final Frontier
Much of the easy work in liberalization has already been done.58
Public procurement is among the most important of the remaining
obstacles. Since there is “little [if any] political incentive for any one
government to liberalize its procurement rules unilaterally,”59 trade
agreements such as the GPA and TTIP play an important role. Case
in point, the United States has been unwilling to liberalize its state
and local procurement markets, but it may be pressured into doing
so via TTIP. Access to these markets will be pivotal to negotiations
due to their size, their historic barriers, and the EU’s manifest
interest in those markets.

54 Id. at xxxiv (reporting that non-tariff trade barriers are “relatively high” in
the area of government procurement); Id. at 183–88 (describing the public
procurement markets as “saddled with” non-tariff trade barriers, which affects the
construction sector most but also affects the information technology, financial,
aerospace, steel metal, transport, chemical, machinery, automotive, wood, and
pharmaceutical sectors).
55 Id. at xxxiv (“Among the most important restrictions to government
procurement in the US are the Berry Amendment, the Buy American Act, the Buy
America Act, procurement restrictions on military purchases and discrimination
against foreign companies, which together create relatively high [non-tariff
barriers] in this area.”).
56 Stein, supra note 50.
57 Berden, supra note 53, at 188.
58 ARROWSMITH ET AL., supra notes 23-25 at 157; Yukins & Schooner, supra note
-26 at 530.
59 Kashdan, supra note 11, at 555. But see Arie Reich, The New GATT Agreement
On Government Procurement: The Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity, 31 J.
OF WORLD TRADE 125, 138 (1997) [hereinafter Reich (1997)] (noting that economists
have long argued that “reciprocity has no intrinsic economic rationale, since trade
liberalization ought to be carried out even on a unilateral basis”) (citing PETER
KENAN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY Section 2.2 (1985)).
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Public procurement is big in absolute terms. Thus, it will matter
to TTIP negotiations simply because of its size. Procurement dollars
account for an estimated 7-9% of global GDP, 14% if utilities are
included,60 or $7 trillion when put into monetary terms.61 The U.S.
federal government alone spends about $1 trillion in goods and
services each year,62 and U.S. state and local governments spend
another $2 trillion,63 for a total about $3 trillion.64 Thus, absolute size
may account for why the EU has so persistently sought access to the
United States’ sub-central procurement markets.65
Public procurement is also big in relative terms. This is because
it has historically “been one of the most protected areas in
international trade.”66 Relative to the private sector, which has long
been subject to market forces, public markets are stagnant and
See ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 2–4.
SCOTT MILLER & DANIEL F. RUNDE, A NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: TRADE,
INVESTMENT, AND PROCUREMENT 21 (2014) (citing Colin Cram, $3.5tn Global Spend on
Local Procurement ‘Woefully’ Mismanaged, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/local-government-network/2012/oct/22/colincram-local-government-global-procurement); cf. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 19,
at 533 (reporting that the figure was $5.5 trillion in 1998) (citing The Size of
Government Procurement Markets, 1 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. J. ON
BUDGETING, 25, 34 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/34/14/1845927.pdf).
62 Michael Keating, The Keating Report: 2014 Forecast on Government Budgets and
Spending – Part 2, GOV’T PRODUCT NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.
americancityandcounty.com/gpn (citing ISH Global Insight) [hereinafter Keating
Report] (predicting federal spending would rise to $1.27 trillion in 2014, up from
$1.25 trillion in 2013); cf. Yukins & Schooner, supra note 19, at 533 (estimating the
figure for 2007 to be $400 billion).
63 DANIELLE M. CONWAY, STATE AND LOCAL PROCUREMENT xiii (2012); see also
Keating Report, supra note 62, at 4 (estimating state and local governments will spend
$1.92 trillion in 2014).
64 Estimates of the combined federal, state, and local total vary. E.g., compare
Keating Report, supra note 62, at 4 (estimating $3.19 trillion in 2014, up from $3.13
trillion in 2013) with Raj Sharma, Letter to the Editor: What About Fairness for
Taxpayers?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2013, at A14 (estimating $1.9 trillion, apparently by
citing figures compiled by the author’s company, the Censeo Group).
65 Yet this explanation only goes so far as the EU stands to gain more from
eliminating high tariffs on vehicles or farming than from public procurement, but
it still resists making these cuts. See Yukins, supra note 7, at 2.
66 Christian Schede, The “Trondheim Provision” in the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement, 5 Pub. Proc. L. REV. 161, 161 (1996); see also Kashdan, supra
note 11, at 555 (noting that governments are “adept at fashioning successful barriers
to foreign participation in domestic government procurement opportunities,” and
mentioning the Buy American Act as an example).
60
61
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uncompetitive – perhaps especially at the sub-central level where
the EU has expressed particular interest.67 It may be that Europeans
have insisted on access to these markets because they anticipate
greater potential for exports at the sub-central government level
than anywhere else in the U.S. economy.
Whatever the EU’s motive for taking an interest in sub-central
procurement markets, clearly this will be an important issue for
TTIP negotiations; in fact, the Europeans have said as much.68 Their
negotiators have repeatedly expressed interest in greater access to
sub-central or sub-federal markets – that is, what Americans more
often call state and local governments.69 And the U.S. government
has taken notice.70
For market access to be meaningful, it must include more than
just the right to transact in that market. It must also include at least
67 See EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Public Procurement:
Initial EU Position Paper (Jul. 12, 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151623.pdf (describing the EU’s goal to expand
sub-central coverage); Note for the Attention of the Trade Policy Committee re:
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (2012), available at
http://www.iatp.org/files/T PC-TTIP-non-Papers-for-1st-Round-NegotiatonsJune20-2013.pdf) (advocating that discussions consider “all sub-central
government entities, including those operating at the local, regional or municipal
level”); EU Aims For New Coverage, ‘GPA-Plus’ Disciplines In TTIP Chapter, 31 INSIDE
U.S. TRADE 1 (Jul. 12, 2013) (describing the EU’s “expansive goals” regarding its
“longstanding demand[s]” for increasing the United States’ central and sub-central
coverage); Karel De Gucht, Team Europe: What We Need for a Successful TTIP (Sept.
23, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13734_en.htm (naming procurement among TTIP’s top four priorities); see also Final
Report: High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth 3 (Feb. 11, 2013), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf
(describing a joint EU-U.S. team’s recommendation for “substantially improved
access to government procurement opportunities at all levels of government”).
68 See also Under Pressure To Show TTIP Progress, U.S., EU Focus on Market
Access, 32 INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Apr. 18, 2004) (reporting that TTIP negotiations will
focus first on market access including government procurement, services, and
investment areas); Structure of Market Access Talks Is Latest Sore Spot in TTIP
Negotiations, 32 INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Apr. 25, 2014) (describing a dispute over terms
of the process and that the EU is insisting that negotiations include public
procurement access along with other subjects).
69 See Structure of Market Access Talks Is Latest Sore Spot in TTIP Negotiations, 32
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Apr. 25, 2014).
70 Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43387, TRANSATLANTIC
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) NEGOTIATIONS 25–26 (2014) (reporting
that the EU wants greater access to sub-central procurement markets and that this
will likely be an issue in TTIP negotiations).
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the basic protections afforded by the GPA. Among these is a right
to challenge breaches of the GPA. That was part of the compact. The
importance to TTIP negotiations of the U.S.’s disregard for this
obligation is further explored in Section IV. It could be pivotal.

3. THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
Before coming to the GPA, it is important to understand what
preceded it, and how the GPA was designed to address the
shortcomings of its predecessor’s system. Subsection A begins with
the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP)71 first
negotiated in 197972 and then amended in 1987.73 With that context,
Subsection B introduces the GPA and Subsection C its enforcement
tools. Finally, Subsection D details the EU-U.S. coverage debate,
starting with the original GPA and continuing with the Revised
GPA, thereby setting up the argument in Section IV that the
coverage debate will be front and center at TTIP negotiations.
3.1. The GATT AGP
The GPA’s predecessor was the AGP (also called the GATT Code
or Tokyo Round Code).74 While the AGP was in some respects a

71 For easy reference, this article refers to the Tokyo Round Agreement on
Government Procurement as the “AGP” or just the “AGP,” while the eponymous
Uruguay Round agreement will be called the “WTO GPA” or just “GPA”. There
are some variations, but this seems to be the consensus in the secondary literature.
72
GATT AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT (1979), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_gpr_e.pdf
[hereinafter
AGP].
73
GATT AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT (AMENDED) (1988),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/gproc_e/gpa_rev_text_1988_e.pdf [hereinafter AGP (1988)].
74 See ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 34-37 (describing the Tokyo
Round’s attempt to deal with non-tariff barriers to trade); Kashdan, supra note 11,
at 556-62 (providing an overview of the Tokyo Round and characterizing it as “the
first step towards a more open regime for international government procurement”);
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“considerable achievement,”75 it also suffered from several defects:
1) its members were few,76 2) its entity and coverage were limited,77
and 3) its enforcement was inadequate. Enforcement issues under
the AGP are discussed in this section, while Subsection B reviews
how the GPA later addressed these problems.
Feeble enforcement is often the “Achilles heel” of trade
agreements, and proved the AGP’s undoing.78
The AGP’s
enforcement measures were “relatively weak,” consisting mainly of
government-to-government negotiations.79 Further, the AGP
“followed the GATT tradition of excluding private parties from all
dispute resolution procedures.”80
Grier, supra note 11, at 387 (calling the GATT Code the first step in allowing U.S.
suppliers to fairly compete for government contracts).
75 See Andrew Halford, An Overview of E.C.-United States Trade Relations in the
Area of Public Procurement, 1 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 35, 36 (1995) (stating that the AGP
was a “considerable achievement” and that it “made some inroads into establishing
a global system of procurement regulation”); PETER TREPTE, REGULATING
PROCUREMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE ENDS AND MEANS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
REGULATION 372-73 (2004) [hereinafter TREPTE (2004)] (explaining that the original
1979 AGP’s “two broad elements of entity coverage by entity list and the
introduction of detailed procedural requirements were maintained and formed the
basis of the [GPA].”).
76 See Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO’s Agreement on
Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?, 2 PUB.
PROCUREMENT L. REV. 63, 73-74 (1995) (suggesting that the “newness” of the AGP
may explain why more states did not join in the 1980s and offering several
explanations about why they were still reluctant 15 years later during the WTO
GPA negotiation).
77 Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 128-29 (describing limited coverage as the
AGP’s “central problem” and that as a result its “economic impact was very
limited”).
78 ARIE REICH, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES ON PUBLIC PURCHASING 126 (1999) [hereinafter REICH
(1999)].
79 Kashdan, supra note 11, at 561-62. Nor did the AGP allow appeals by private
parties directly to the GATT. See Isabel Dendauw, New WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement: An Analysis of the Framework of Bid Challenge Procedures and
the Question of Direct Effect, 18 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 254, 254-55 (2000)
(stating that the GPA introduced the “direct challenge” system, allowing private
parties to bring actions on their own behalf before the contracting party’s national
courts, without having to go through their States).
80 Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 130-31 (citing Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The
Dispute Settlement Systems of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the
GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1169
(1994)).
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Though the AGP was well-intended, members “soon realized”
that these measures were insufficient and that achieving their
objectives required a detailed procedural regime going beyond
solely prohibiting discrimination.81 Among other things, an
effective agreement would require a means by which aggrieved
suppliers could challenge discriminatory awards.82 Since only such
interested parties would have the sufficient incentive to challenge
discrimination, government-to-government talks were no
substitute.83
Further, an effective forum to challenge awards required certain
features. First, for the sake of both suppliers and procuring
agencies, it must provide a speedy resolution to their complaints,84
which is often of even more import to the procuring agency.85
Another factor that must be considered is whether protests are
worthwhile, both in terms of the probability of success and potential
81 Arie Reich, WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
321, 334 (2004) [hereinafter Reich (2004)].
82 Id.; see also Schede, supra note 66, at 170-71 (explaining that the
intergovernmental panel rulings were only a minimal deterrent); REICH (1999),
supra note 78, at 307 (describing growing complaints about “lax implementation”
of AGP due in part to insufficient enforcement mechanisms).
83 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO
Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 114-15 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
ed., 1997) (arguing that “practice experience” in the United States and EU “confirm
that the citizens themselves and the courts are in a better position to protect
individual rights and nondiscriminatory competition than political bodies
dominated by majority politics”); ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 402 (arguing
that the “availability of challenge procedures to those with the strongest motivation
to enforce the rules and the best opportunities to spot breaches increases the risks
of non-compliance for procuring entities and thus improves deterrence”).
84 See Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, Basic Elements of the Agreement
on Government Procurement, in LAW AND POLICY IN PUBLIC PURCHASING: THE WTO
AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 20-21 (Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros
Mavroidis eds., 1997) (arguing that “unless rapid action can be taken,
inconsistencies with the Agreement will de facto be tolerated because firms will not
have an interest” in litigation before the WTO); ARROWSMITH, ET AL., supra note 18,
at 761 (explaining that “[s]peedy remedies are particularly important in public
procurement” as a “contract will often be awarded, and the work begun, quite
quickly following the conclusion of the award procedure, making it difficult to
correct the breach once the review body has heard the case”).
85 See Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The Choices that Every
Procurement Challenge System Must Make, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 427, 431 (2006)
(describing the procuring entity’s interest in having a system that “efficiently and
promptly complete[s] its core role”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

314

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

for meaningful relief.86 As talks proceeded on the GPA, the parties
reached a compromise that would set forth minimum rules and
establish forums to ensure aggrieved suppliers had the proper
incentives to challenge contracts that were unfairly awarded to
domestic suppliers.87
As a historical note, commentators have suggested that the
challenge procedures under that new GPA discussed below were
proposed in response to the United States’ dissatisfaction with the
Trondheim decision.88 Some also hold that the United States modeled
its proposal on the EU’s Remedies Directive to ensure the new
agreement would include meaningful domestic challenge
procedures.89 Whatever the origin, one of the United States’ goals
86 See Arwel Davies, Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: A Critical View, 20
WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 113, 129 (1997) (arguing that disappointed
suppliers’ “willingness to litigate will depend upon the confidence which firms
have in the independence of the review”); Gordon, supra note 85, at 442-44
(explaining that before challenging an award that disappointed suppliers want to
know firms’ interest in knowing the difficulty of winning a protest and if winning
affords “any meaningful relief”); see also Gordon, supra note 85, at 430-32
(explaining that ensuring speedy resolution and the provision of an effective forum
for bid protests can be antagonistic goals, and that this “overarching tension can
be viewed as the tension between the desire to exhaustively investigate any
complaint . . . and the need to let the procurement process move forward” and that
“[t]here will always be tension between the first cluster of goals and the goal of
avoiding undue disruption to the procurement system”).
87 EU and U.S. experience has shown that granting standing to aggrieved
suppliers is an effective surveillance and enforcement mechanism. See Petersmann,
supra note 83, at 114-15.
88 In that case, an American firm complained it was unfairly excluded from a
Norwegian contract for electronic toll collection equipment for the city of
Trondheim. The U.S. complained before the intergovernmental review panel, and
although the panel held that Norway had violated the treaty, it provided an
unsatisfying remedy: Norway was ordered to prospectively amend its award
procedures, but the panel did not annul the award so that the contract could be recompeted. See Dendauw, supra note 79, at 255-57 (citing Report of the Panel,
Norway-Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim, GATT Doc
GPR.DS2/R (April 28, 1992), GATT Doc GPR/M/46 at 13 (1992)); Schede, supra
note 66, at 171 (attributing the GPA’s challenge system to “lessons learned from
Trondheim”); Petros C. Mavroidis, Government Procurement Agreement: The
Trondheim Case: The Remedies Issue, 48 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 77, 87-93 (1993)
(analyzing the inadequacy of the remedies under the AGP exemplified in the
Trondheim case).
89 Several commentators agree that the EU’s Remedies Directive served as a
model for the GPA. See, e.g., Dendauw, supra note 79, at 262 (writing that Article
XX is “very much inspired by the Remedies Directive”); Gerard de Graaf &

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/6

2015]

HIDDEN STATUTORY BAR

315

was the “provision of meaningful dispute resolution mechanisms at
the national level,”90 and it is clear that the AGP’s defects informed
its position during negotiations.

3.2. The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)
Separate negotiations on government procurement, concurrent
with WTO negotiations in 1993,91 ultimately led to the creation of
the GPA.92 The GPA’s purpose was to expand trade, end trade
Specifically,
discrimination, and enhance transparency.93
negotiators sought expanded coverage to include services, improve
enforcement, and address the concerns that kept developing
countries from joining.94 They succeeded at the former two but
failed at the latter; membership has hardly budged.95
To accomplish its objectives, the GPA lays down two main
principles: non-discrimination and national treatment.96 “[T]he
Matthew King, Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion
of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round,
29 INT'L LAW. 435, 437 (1995) (stating that “key elements of the new GPA are derived
largely from the European Union's directives on public procurement”).
90 Kashdan, supra note 11, at 569 (listing the United States’ nine goals for the
GPA).
91 See Judith H. Bello & Mary E. Footer, Symposium: Uruguay Round-GATT/WTO, Preface, 29 INT'L LAW. 335, 343 (1995) (explaining that the GPA was
“negotiated on a separate but parallel track” with the rest of the WTO treaty; that
negotiations on the GPA commenced not in Punta del Este in September 1986 with
the rest of the WTO negotiations, but in Montreal in December 1988; and that these
negotiations were concluded in January 1994, or one month after the Uruguay
Round Final Act).
92 See GPA, supra note 16.
93 See id. Preamble.
94 Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 76, at 64.
95 Id.
96 See GPA, Article III, supra note 16 (adopting the two pillars of the GATT); see
also SUE ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PROCUREMENT 1333-34 (2d
ed. 2005) [hereinafter ARROWSMITH (2005)] (arguing national treatment means
granting foreign suppliers the same rights as firms “even when the rights of
domestic firms go beyond the specific minimum requirements on award
procedures and remedies set out in the GPA”).
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former,” Mavroidis and Hoekman write, “refers to a legal
prohibition on discrimination between foreign products,” and the
“latter refers to a legal prohibition on discrimination . . . between
foreign and domestic sources.”97 Additionally, the GPA establishes
some minimum standards for procurement systems,98 whose “direct
aim is to open up government procurement markets . . . while at the
same time allowing for governments to procure in a rational way.”99
The GPA is a plurilateral agreement, meaning that unlike
multilateral agreements, which are required for WTO membership,
the GPA is optional, and declining to join affects neither status100 nor
membership in the WTO.101 Peter Trepte succinctly captures the
Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 76, at 66.
“Implementation of the basic obligations of non-discrimination is ensured
by setting out a number of detailed operational rules for tendering to be followed
by procuring entities.” TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 377; ARROWSMITH (2005),
supra note 96, at 1339 (explaining that the GPA “requir[es] states to follow
transparent contract award procedures, to ensure that contract opportunities are
known to foreign industry and to ensure that discrimination cannot be hidden”).
For example, signatories are to use open, selective, and limited tendering
procedures “in a non-discriminatory manner.” GPA, art. VII.1, supra note 16. They
are not to share bidders’ private information if that would “have the effect of
precluding competition.” Id., art. VII.2. Advertisements for procurement
opportunities must include nature, quantity, method of tendering (i.e., open,
selective, negotiated), starting date, tender deadline, procuring entity’s address,
technical requirements, and terms of payment. Id., art. IX.6. The deadline cannot
be less than, e.g., 40 days for open tendering. Id., art. XI.2(a). Opening tenders must
be done “under procedures and conditions guaranteeing the regularity of the
openings.” Id., art. XIII.3. Specifications, advertising, and regulations should be
designed to ensure transparency. Id., art. XVII.1. As well, signatories must provide
for basic challenge procedures. Id., art. XX.
99 Marceau & Blank, supra note 10, at 122; cf. Gordon, supra note 85, at 430-32
(describing the tension between the competing goals of transparency, integrity, and
provision private remedies versus “having the procurement system efficiently and
promptly complete its core role, the acquisition of goods or services that the
Government needs”).
100 See EMILY BARBOUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R31406, TRADE AGREEMENTS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND U.S. LAWS 45 (2012)
(explaining that plurilateral agreements “are not prerequisites to WTO
membership”); Alan W.H. Gourley, Jean Grier & Frederick F. Shaheen, International
Legal Developments in Review: 2000 Business Regulation International Procurement, 35
INT'L LAW. 395, 400 (2001) (explaining that the GPA applies only to the signatories);
JACKSON, supra note 9, at 403 (explaining that agreements contained in Annex 4 are
“hortatory” or “optional” and that this was “a departure from the single package
ideal” of the rest of the agreement).
101 But see Sue Arrowsmith, The Character and Role of National Challenge
Procedures Under the Government Procurement Agreement, 4 PUB. PROCUREMENT L.
97
98
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GOA’s complicated interrelation with the rest of the WTO: “While
[the GPA] remains part of the GATT/WTO family by virtue of its
inclusion in the WTO annexes and is served by the WTO Secretariat
and Dispute Settlement Body, the GPA . . . remains binding on and
confers benefits only to those members who have signed up to it.”102
As another commentator noted, it is “the only major part of the
Uruguay Round package . . . that allows voluntary rather than full
participation.”103
When the GPA went into force on January 1, 1996 there were just
25 signatories.104 Given that less than a quarter of the WTO members
had initially joined,105 the GPA is often criticized for limited
membership,106 especially because so few poor and developing
countries have joined.107 This will continue to be a challenge – not
REV. 235, 236 (2002) (explaining that although the GPA is not mandatory for current
members, new members “are now often expected to commit to signing it as a price
for their ticket of admission”).
102 TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 374.
103 ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE URUGUAY ROUND
AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 198 (1995). In fact, the GPA
“is one of four plurilateral agreements under the umbrella of the WTO, which do
not require participation of all WTO signatories.” JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, THE URUGUAY
ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 66 (1994); see also Mavroidis & Hoekman, supra note 76, at
n.2 (1995) (contrasting the GPA with “most of the other Tokyo Round codes,” which
are multilateral and mandatory,” and listing the four plurilateral agreements: “the
GPA, the civil aircraft agreement, and the arrangements on bovine meat and dairy
products”) (citing WTO Agreement, Annex 4(b)).
104 The founding members were Canada, the EU (and its member countries),
Finland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
See Agreement on Government Procurement: Parties, Observers, and Accessions, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/
memobs_e.htm.
105 See, e.g., Arrowsmith (2002), supra note 11, at 768-71 (explaining that in 2002
“less than one quarter of the WTO’s 140-plus members” were signatories while
discussing the various “obstacles to wider participation”).
106 Id. at 103-06 (reviewing the economic and political reasons that discourage
“obstacles to wider participation” in the GPA); Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note
76, at 73-77 (arguing that “the absence of broad-based participation is a source of
concern”).
107 See, e.g., Victor Misoti, The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: A
Necessary Evil in the Legal Strategy for Development in the Poor World?, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 593, 596 (2004) (noting that the “common thread” is the presence rich
countries and the absence of poor ones); CROOME, infra note 113, at 76-77 (noting
that “[f]ewer countries . . . signed the [GPA] than any other code, and all but three
of its signatories were developed countries”); Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 134
(noting that the GPA remains a “rich man’s club”).
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so much because countries’ interests diverge but because officials
are reluctant to relinquish control over public spending for reasons
both legitimate and illegitimate.108

108 One challenge with promoting free trade is that the “immediate impact” is
concentrated in a single industry, with lost jobs and profits, while the benefits are
often defuse. See ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 11-12 (citing PAUL R.
KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY,
Chapter 11 (5th ed. 2000)). Arrowsmith identifies four types of collateral policies,
whose immediate benefits governments are reluctant to give up in exchange for the
more ephemeral gains to be had from free trade: measures granting domestic
industry a competitive advantage; secondary objectives of a non-economic nature;
illegitimate practices such as corruption, nepotism, and patronage; domestic
procurement rules concerned with commercial objectives. Id. at 13-19. It may be
that they “are not prepared to give up their use of procurement for policy objectives
that involve discrimination.” Id. at 440; see also Patrick A. Low, Aaditya Mattoo &
Arvind Subramanian, Government Procurement in Services, in HOEKMAN &
MAVROIDIS, supra note 84, at 225-26 (attributing the reluctance to open up
procurement to competition to “two broad reasons”: that it is “valued political
patronage,” and that it is a “means of protecting certain industries”).
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Membership now stands at 43 states,109 mainly due to the EU’s
expansion.110 Several more are currently undergoing or considering
negotiations,111 including China112 and India.113
Despite limited membership, the GPA was heralded as “one of
the large and lasting accomplishments of the Uruguay Round.”114

109 The new members since January 1, 1996 are Armenia, Aruba, the new EU
member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Hong Kong,
Iceland, Korea, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Taiwan. See Agreement on Government
Procurement: Parties, Observers and Accessions, WTO (Nov. 1, 2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (listing party
nations to the GPA and the RGPA, and noting the corresponding date of entry into
force or accession).
110 The EU has expanded from 15 to 28 member states from 1996 to present.
See EU Member Countries, http://eur opa.eu/about-eu/countries/membercountries/index_en.htm (noting that Croatia was the most recent addition to the
EU on July 1, 2013).
111 Albania, China, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, New
Zealand, Oman, and Ukraine are all negotiating entry into the GPA; all but three of
these (Montenegro, New Zealand, and the Ukraine) already have been in observer
status for a decade or more. See Agreement on Government Procurement: Parties,
Observers
and
Accessions,
WTO
(Nov.
1,
2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (listing party
nations to the GPA and the RGPA, and noting the corresponding date of entry into
force or accession).
112 Though significant obstacles remain, China is much further along in the
negotiation process than is India. See Ping Wang, Accession to the Agreement on
Government Procurement, in GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO 92-116 (Sue
Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson eds., 2011) (recounting that China rejected
pressure to join the GPA as precondition to WTO membership and that its initial
offer was spurned as “deeply disappointing,” and recommending a “phased”
approach to entity coverage); Skye Mathieson, Accessing China’s Public Procurement
Market: Which State-Influenced Enterprises Should the WTO’s Government Procurement
Agreement Cover?, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 239-241 (2010) (explaining the role of state
owned firms in the Chinese economy and how coverage of these firms affects
China’s GPA accession negotiations).
113 Though a participant in the AGP negotiations, India has yet to enter formal
membership negotiations and did not even assume official observer status until
2010. See S. Chakravarthy & Kamala Dawar, India’s Possible Accession to the
Agreement on Government Procurement: What Are the Pros and Cons?, in ARROWSMITH
& ANDERSON, supra note 113, at 117-39 (listing the reasons for India’s reluctance);
JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 77, 184-85 (2d ed. 1999)
(describing India’s role in the original AGP negotiations in 1987).
114 Bello & Footer, supra note 91, at 343.
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Its significance within the WTO system has only grown since then,115
having proven a success in several respects.116
First, it has freed up government procurement as never before.
Following negotiations, the GPA was predicted to open up $350
billion of U.S. procurements and as much as $1 trillion of global
procurement markets,117 or “approximately a tenfold increase in the
value of contracts open to bidding under the present [AGP].”118
While cross-border procurement trade may not have proven as
common as might have been hoped for,119 gains in trade have been
significant and the GPA is still a major victory for free trade.120 For
example, the GPA now affords access to $1.6 trillion in procurement

115 See Lamy Notes Rising Interest in WTO Government Procurement Agreement,
NEWS PRESS (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Rising Interest] (reporting that WTO
Director-General Pascal Lamy said the GPA “appears to be in the process of taking
on relatively greater importance in the constellation of the WTO Agreements,” in
part because it “recognizes the need for governance mechanisms”).
116 Perhaps the success of the GPA’s negotiations and implementation is due,
in part, to its plurilateral status; it was easier to reach an agreement among a few
rich countries with common interests and values than if negotiations had included
the larger and more diverse membership of the WTO. Multilateral deals are,
presumably, harder to strike.
117 Compare de Graaf & King, supra note 89, at 435-36, and PREEG, supra note
103, at 198 (predicting annual coverage of “$400 billion in procurement contracts,
of which three-quarters are in the EU and the United States”).
118 de Graaf & King, supra note 89, at 435-36; see Grier, supra note 11, at 387-92
(supporting the fact that a “tenfold expansion” has occurred in the GATT Code).
119 See, e.g., HEJING CHEN & JOHN WHALLEY, THE WTO GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPACTS ON TRADE, The National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper 17365, 17-20, 30 (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www 10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08931.pdf (using a “gravity
model” to ascertain the impact on trade and finding that “government procurement
markets seem far from being internationally integrated”).
120 See, e.g., Robert D. Anderson et al., Assessing the Value of Future Accessions
to the WTO Agreement On Government Procurement (GPA): Some New Data
Sources, Provisional Estimates, and an Evaluative Framework for Individual WTO
Members Considering Accession, World Trade Organization Economic Research
and Statistics Division, ERSD-2011-15, 20-21 (Oct. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.wto.org/english /res_e /reser_e/ersd201115_e.pdf (citing studies
showing cross-border rates as high as 30 percent in the EU); Lena Johansson, Crossborder public procurement – an EU perspective, Swedish National Board of Trade
(Nov. 2011), available at http://www.kommers.se/Documents/
dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2011/rapporter/Report%20-%20Cross-border%
20Public%20Procurement.pdf (summarizing studies on cross-border procurement
among GPA members and within the EU).
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markets.121 Although direct cross-border purchases are relatively
few, foreign-affiliated firms (e.g., firms with local subsidiaries or
joint ventures) enjoy a higher penetration rate than the figures might
otherwise suggest.122 Therefore, the GPA has been a success both in
terms of scale and market penetration and has thereby done much
to liberalize this market.123
Second, just as the Uruguay Round agreement “deepened,”
“widened,” and “enlarge[ed]” the GATT obligations, the GPA has
done likewise for government procurement.124 While the AGP
covered only goods125 and the Uruguay Round negotiations initially
prohibited even the discussion of services,126 GPA negotiations
sought coverage of services from the beginning.127 Later, coverage
121 See ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 120, at 18-20 (detailing the guaranteed
market access afforded to GPA members, especially in the United States and the
EU, which constitute “75% of the total value of existing market access opportunities
under the GPA, i.e. US $1.2 trillion”); United States, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, The WTO Government Procurement Agreement: A Tremendous
Opportunity for China, available at http://shenyang.usembassy -china.org.cn/wtogpa.html (estimating the GPA affords members access to $1.6 trillion in
procurement markets).
122 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 120, at 20-24 (explaining that while one
European Commission study reports that direct cross-border procurement only
“accounts for 1.6% of awards or roughly 3.5% of the total value of contract awards”
this “figure rises to 16.9% when indirect cross-border procurement is taken into
account, and overall to 29.9%, taking into account the additional effect of imports
by local agents and distributors”).
123 But see Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 136-38 (describing coverage that is
“significantly more limited than expected” than a “quick glance at coverage
annexes might suggest” since the “purported expansion of coverage is beset by a
myriad of derogations”).
124 See Jacque Pelkmans, The Economic Significance of the Round, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND RESULTS: A EUROPEAN LAWYER’S PERSPECTIVE 44-45 (Jacques H.J. Bourgeois,
Frédéric Berrod & Eric Gippini Fourner eds., 1996).
125 AGP, supra note 73, Article I.1(a) (establishing that the AGP would apply
only as to goods, and making only a limited exception for services “incidental to
the supply of products”).
126 See CROOME, supra note 113, at 76 (explaining that the GPA and the general
Uruguay Round negotiations were kept separate in part because the GPA
“included negotiations on services as well as goods, and thereby mixed two
elements that were supposedly kept rigidly apart under the ground-rules of the
Uruguay Round”). The WTO was later extended to include coverage of services
with passage of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), or what
became Annex 1B to the WTO Agreement. See JACKSON (2000), supra note 9, at 184,
190, 402, 406.
127 GPA, supra note 16, Article I.2 (establishing that the GPA would cover “any
combination of products and services”); GPA, supra note 16, Preamble (reciting that
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improved services and construction128 and expanded to include
some sub-central governments and utilities.129 And it eliminated
offsets130 with only a few exceptions131 – no mean feat given their
proliferation elsewhere.132
But there was trouble in paradise. In addition to limited
membership, another shortcoming was coverage. Restrictive
coverage was the tradeoff for “far-reaching obligations,” and the
GPA only covers entities and contracts its members submit to.133
GPA principles “apply in a qualified manner to specified entities,
goods, and services, which have been the subject of extensive
bilateral negotiations[.]”134 Describing the 1993 negotiations Trepte
writes, “These negotiations were largely bilateral with each party

one of the goals of this agreement was to “expand the coverage of the [GPA] to
include service contracts”).
128 PREEG, supra note 103, at 198.
129 Id.
130 GPA Article XVI, supra note 16, at n.7 (“Offsets are measures used to
encourage local development by means such as requirements for domestic content,
licensing of technology, investment, or countertrade.”); Kashdan, supra note 11, at
572 (The Tokyo Round Code, by contrast, “discouraged but did not prohibit the use
of offsets.”).
131 GPA, Article, XVI.2, supra note 16 (listing domestic content requirements as
one example; further, only one exception is mentioned in Article XVI “development” in “developing countries.” ); Article XXIII.1, and most countries
omit defense ministries from their covered entities in their Annex 1. See, e.g.,
Government Procurement, The Plurilateral Agreement on Government
Procurement: Appendices and Annexes to the GPA: United States, Appendix I,
Annex
1,
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm
(omitting
the Department of Defense from the covered central government entities). This
exception for defense offsets is increasingly criticized. See, e.g., Drew B. Miller, Is it
Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 93, 9596 (2009) (explaining that the defense trade “represents an immense segment of
government procurement” that has been “largely excluded from the march toward
liberalization”).
132 See, e.g., Bernard Udis, Offsets and Industrial Participation, in RICHARD A.
BITZINGER, THE MODERN DEFENSE INDUSTRY:
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES 257-64 (2009) (recounting the growth of defense offsets and
describing them as “ubiquitous” in the industry).
133 Mavroidis & Hoekman, supra note 76, at 63-64.
134 Trepte (2004), supra note 75, at 368.
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negotiating with the others resulting in a kaleidoscope of reciprocal
arrangements between the parties.”135 The results were not pretty.136
This has given rise to several problems. First, on closer
inspection, coverage is “significantly more limited” than it may
appear at first.137 Second, bespoke coverage diluted the GPA’s
efficacy as members carved out exceptions based on idiosyncrasies
of domestic politics.138 Third, what coverage countries negotiate for
during accession depends on relative bargaining power, rather than
any sensible moral, legal, or economic criterion.139 And Reich
Id. at 375.
Id. (stating, “The resulting annexes to the GPA contain not only lists of
entities and contracts covered; they also contain a variety of derogations and
reciprocity clauses which apply differently between the various parties.”).
137 Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 136-37.
138 Id. at 140-41 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2512(a)). (Reich relates a striking example
from the United States:
135
136

One prominent example is provided by the United States who, in its
implementation of the GPA, has basically barred all countries which have
not joined the [GPA] from participating in tenders for U.S. Government
contracts subject to the GPA. . . . As a result, the position of non-GPA
suppliers has been significantly worsened compared to the situation prior
to the Code. Before the Code, they were allowed to compete for U.S.
government contracts, and were only subject to the 6 or 12 percent price
differential under the Buy American Act. Thus, if their bid was lower than
the comparable U.S. bid by more than the differential, they still win the
contract. Now, however, they are not allowed to compete at all, except
perhaps in cases where the product cannot be obtained from U.S. or GPA
sources.
(requiring the President to prohibit the procurement of goods from non-GPA
countries with exceptions for developing countries and when the goods are
unavailable in GPA countries)).
139 Writing about the Chinese experience with the GPA accession process and
then generalizing from that experience in his concluding remarks, Wang writes:
The GPA’s approach to covered entities and procurement remains
complex and lacks a general principle that facilitates the preparation of
coverage offers by acceding countries. In the absence of general rules, the
outcome of accession negotiations based upon reciprocity largely depends
on the bargaining power of the acceding country and the expectation of
existing Parties. (Emphasis added).
Wang, supra note 112, at 114. He suggests that because so much depends on
bargaining power and negotiation tactics, China made an unreasonable offer on
purpose:
Since the extent to which an acceding country can enjoy special treatment
available for developing countries and retain existing discriminatory
national policies by derogation is also subject to negotiation, China’s initial
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describes a fourth problem with so many crisscrossing coverage
arrangements:
[B]ecause the derogations are so detailed and complicated, it
is extremely hard to know if a particular procurement is
covered under the GPA, and if it is open to all GPA suppliers
or only to some. This seriously impairs the commercial
predictability of the procurement regime set up by the GPA.
It also makes the [GPA] very hard to implement.140
Multiple arrangements complicate foreign market access,
increase transaction costs, and reduce the incentive to compete in
those markets.141 These arrangements undermine the goals of the
GPA.
Not all coverage rules were negotiated in this manner. Although
these rules are mostly “determined through negotiating reciprocal
concessions . . . there are some ‘common’ coverage rules[.]”142 The
existence of such common rules suggests negotiations were more
than just a political contest with each member country simply
attempting to maximize its own interests. These common rules
suggest members were also motivated by a sense of the common
good and sought to harmonize rules, increase transparency, and
build legitimacy.143
offer of coverage, although disappointingly limited as highlighted in
section 2, may arguably reflect a strategic choice of negotiation technique.
Id. If Wang is right about that, his analysis does not bode well for future accession
talks, and not only with China.
140 Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 139.
141 Id. at 136 (explaining the GPA’s approach is not only that its “coverage
significantly more limited than expected but, more importantly, that the GPA in
fact harbours an intra-discriminatory trade regime between its Members”) (emphasis
added); Kashdan, supra note 11, at 571-72 (describing the “large number of
permutations” among the various countries’ annexes regarding coverage of entities
and contract types).
142 Arrowsmith (2002), supra note 11, at 784-85 (listing the treatment of
concessions and the use of framework agreements as two of these common
coverage rules).
143 To be sure, such goals are not mutually exclusive. Harmonization “reduces
barriers to trade because it reduces transaction costs for vendors crossing borders”
thereby increasing trade flows and liberalizing the market. Yukins & Schooner,
supra note 19, at 531. It also promotes economic development and “efficient
procurement markets.” Id. at 531-32 (citing Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M.
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When an agreement was first reached, hopes were high for what
the WTO GPA could accomplish.144 Considered as a part of the
larger WTO, it was lauded as “perhaps the most important
development in international economic law since the Bretton Woods
Agreement”145 and “one of the most ambitious efforts at
international lawmaking and institution building since the
establishment of the United Nations.”146 Yet as Mavroidis and
Hoekman presciently noted, “much depend[ed] on the diligence
and good faith of the GPA signatories that put into place and
appl[ied] the challenge procedures.”147 Such efforts have been
imperfect and uneven.
After a digression in Subsection C to describe the GPA’s new
enforcement mechanisms, Subsection D returns to the question of
coverage, considering the GPA negotiations in 1993 and the Revised
GPA negotiations in the last decade.

Hoekman, International Cooperation and the Reform of Public Procurement Policies 32
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3720, Sept. 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract821424); see also Yukins & Schooner, supra note 19, at 55758, 561-63 (elaborating on the GPA’s potential in the harmonization of global
procurement); Rising Interest, supra note 115 (lauding the GPA since it “recognizes
the need for governance mechanisms”). Reich considers harmonization “a
byproduct with many blessings” even though it “was never an official objective of
the [GPA].” Reich (2004), supra note 81, at 335. He continues, “In addition to
compelling many states to introduce clear, transparent, and truly competitive rules
of tendering that prevent not only domestic protectionism, but also corrupt
favouritism, the greater uniformity between the national systems also makes it
easier for suppliers to participate in the market for foreign government contracts.”
Id.
144 See, e.g., Bello & Footer, supra note 91, at 343 (stating that although the GPA
was only a voluntary agreement with limited membership, “in light of the
continuing significance of government procurements in world trade and the
substantive expansion of the agreement with respect to its scope and coverage, this
agreement is expected to be one of the large and lasting accomplishments of the
Uruguay Round”).
145 JOHN H. JACKSON & ALAN O. SYKES, IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 1
(1997) [hereinafter JACKSON & SYKES].
146 David E. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United
States, in JACKSON & SYKES at 175.
147 Mavroidis & Hoekman, supra note 76, at 70; see also JACKSON & SYKES, supra
note 145, at 1 (warning that the “extent of this transformation will rest chiefly on
the faithful implementation of new international legal obligations in the domestic
law of each country”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

326

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

3.3. New Enforcement Mechanisms Under the GPA
In response to the ineffectual enforcement mechanisms under
the AGP, the GPA granted a private right to challenge breaches of
the GPA rules in importing states’ domestic forums.148 Article XX.2
provided, “Each Party shall provide non-discriminatory, timely,
transparent and effective procedures enabling suppliers to
challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement arising in the context
of procurements in which they have, or have had, an interest.”149
This was a departure from the AGP and “arguably the most
innovative aspect of the [WTO] GPA.”150 It was innovative in that
firms could make direct challenges using domestic forums without
“having to go through their governments as in the case under
‘normal’ WTO dispute settlement procedures.”151 Arrowsmith
explains this “mark[ed] a departure from the approach of most other
WTO agreements,” which had not afforded a private cause of action
but “rel[ied] mainly on inter-governmental enforcement”
mechanisms.152 This is a “rare example in the WTO-system where
private parties can invoke WTO-law before domestic courts.”153

See GPA, Article XX, supra note 16.
Id. at Article XX.2.
150 HOEKMAN & MAVROIDIS (1997), supra note 84, at 20-21; see also Dendauw,
supra note 79, at 254-55 (describing the new procedures as “revolutionary”); Mary
Footer, Remedies Under the New GATT Agreement Procurement, 4 PUB. PROC. L. REV.
80, 88-91 (1995) (describing the new challenge procedures as “undoubtedly” the
“most innovative step in the new GPA”); Kashdan, supra note 11, at 573 (describing
the strengthened dispute resolution mechanisms one of the GPA’s “major
advancements” over the Tokyo Round); Arrowsmith (2002), supra note 11, at 788
(noting the WTO generally is not “enforceable by private parties” and arguing
“judicialiation” “was possible because of the GPA’s plurilateral character and the
fact that most of the original parties were already obliged to provide challenge
procedures under regional agreements”).
151 HOEKMAN & MAVROIDIS (1997), supra note 84, at 48-49 (calling this new
mechanism a “major textual change” to the 1988 agreement).
152 ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 385, n.99 (noting some other
exceptions for private enforcement) (citing Agreement in Pre-shipment Inspection,
Article 4; GATT Article X; GATS Article VI(2); Agreement on Customs Evaluation,
Article XI; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 23; Trade
Related Intellectual Property Measures, Article 42).
153 Mavroidis & Hoekman, supra note 76, at 70.
148
149
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A debate rages about whether the GPA alone has direct effect154
or depends on implementing legislation to take effect.155 Settling
that debate is beyond the scope of this Article because the EU, it
appears, knew that the United States planned on passing
implementing legislation that would ensure that the GPA would not
have direct effect.156 And that is just what Congress did with the
supremacy clause of the URAA.157 Thus, whether the GPA (but for
the supremacy clause) would have had direct effect is an academic
question and is of no practical significance. It will not be considered
here.
What is important, however, and what European negotiators
apparently did not know, was that Congress would then pass
implementing legislation exempting the United States from the
requirement that a forum be provided for private challenges under

154 Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International
Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 51, 76-90 (2012)
(explaining direct effect in the sense that no other act is required to confer a right,
written within the treaty, on an individual or party ); see generally John H. Jackson,
United States of America, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 144-56 (Francis
G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987) (defining “self-executing” treaties and
explaining the legal approach, particularly in the United States, of how to
determine if a treaty is self-executing); see, e.g., Johannes Schnitzer, Regulating Public
Procurement Law at Supranational Level: the Example of EU Agreements on Public
Procurement, 10 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 301, 326-28 (2010) (arguing that the GPA has
direct effect or “applicability” due, in part, because the GPA is very similar in
formation to the EC Public Procurement Directives “whose direct ‘applicability’ has
been recognised”).
155 Davies, supra note 86, at 127-28 (arguing that although parts of the GPA
may have direct effect, Article XX is not directly effective because “its operation is
conditional upon implementation of the discretionary requirements”);
ARROWSMITH (2005), supra note 96, at 1334-35 (arguing that the GPA does not have
direct effect); Pierre Didier, The Uruguay Round Government Procurement Agreement:
Implementation in the European Union, in HOEKMAN & MAVROIDIS (1997), supra note
84, at 138-39 (arguing that the effect unambiguously direct, despite several EU
statements and decisions reaching the opposite conclusion); PETER TREPTE, PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT IN THE EU 130-31 (2007) [hereinafter TREPTE (2007)] (explaining the
EU’s position that the GPA does not have direct effect); Schaefer, supra note 7, at
627-30 (describing GPA member countries as either dualists or monists and
distinguishing the former, which require implementing legislation, from the latter,
which do not).
156 See Didier, supra note 155, at 138 (arguing that the other GPA parties knew
that the United States’ implementing legislation would explicitly rule out direct
effect).
157 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1); see also note 248, infra, and accompanying text.
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the GPA.158 That the United States would not recognize the direct
effect of the GPA did not mean that it would not comply with the
GPA because implementing legislation could have served the same
purposes. These two propositions are “analytically distinct.”159 If
Congress had passed legislation giving Article XX effect, the
Europeans would have had cause for neither surprise nor
disappointment. Implementation of the GPA works in much the
same way in the EU; for example, rather than being given direct
effect, Article XX is given effect through the Remedies Directive.160
But Congress did not do that. Instead, the URAA’s supremacy
clause precludes direct effect of the GPA, and then the URAA denies
private parties a cause of action under the GPA.
European negotiators were not alone; the consensus among
scholars was also that a private cause of action under Article XX
depended primarily on implementing legislation.161 Each member
was “to repeal or amend any national legislation” inconsistent with
the GPA.162 But the United States did not pass implementing
legislation giving effect to Article XX. Later, Subsection IV explores
See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c); see also notes 234-246, infra, and accompanying text.
Schaefer, supra note 7, at 610 n. 3 (arguing that “whether an international
agreement has direct effect . . . is an analytically distinct question from whether the
agreement can be invoked by a particular private party”) (citing Jackson, supra note
154; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR. REL. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 111 cmt. g
(1987)).
160 Remedies Directive for the Private Sector, Directive 89/665/EEC, available
at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:
1989L0665:20080109:EN:PDF [hereinafter Remedies Directive] (detailing how states
will act to ensure the GPA is in effect), as amended by Council Directive
2007/66/EC amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC, available
at http://eurlex. europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:335:0031:
0046:EN:PDF (amending the Remedies Directive and providing suppliers with
additional remedies); see also TREPTE (2007), supra note 155, at 131 (explaining that
these revisions to the Remedies Directive were made in order to comply with the
GPA’s obligations).
161 See, e.g., REICH (1999), supra note 78, at 309-12 (noting the consistency of the
EU directives with the GPA); ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 43-46 (discussing
the importance of domestic legislation to implement the GPA’s requirements;
Hans-Joachim Priess & Pascal Friton, Designing Effective Challenge Procedures: The
EU’s Experience with Remedies, in ARROWSMITH & ANDERSON, supra note 113, at 53031 (explaining the significance of implementing legislation for the GPA); Dendauw,
supra note 79, at 262-63 (explaining that due to superior remedies afforded under
the EU Remedies Directives that it was unnecessary to amend the Directives).
162 ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 44-45.
158
159
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the United States’ record on this score and examines the section of
the URAA that specifically bars private litigation under the GPA.
3.4. The EU-U.S. Debates on Coverage: 1993-Present
This section considers first the original GPA negotiations in
1993-94, and reviews the Revised GPA negotiations in the first
decade of the 2000s. In both cases, the EU-U.S. debates centered on
the coverage issues. Access to sub-federal markets was a seminal
issue to the Europeans. The terms of this debate lay the groundwork
for Subsection B, which considers how Europeans’ past experience
with the URAA may affect TTIP negotiations.
3.4.1. The Original GPA Negotiations (1993)
The 1979 AGP first established the “entity coverage by entity
list” method that has been used since.163 “To a large extent,” the
GPA negotiations were “dominated by the European Union and the
United States, which together account for a substantial share of
procurement contracts.”164 “The bargaining over entity coverage
which had been the hallmark of previous negotiations,” Trepte
recounts, “reached a fever pitch during the Uruguay Round[.]”165
This was due in part to the marching orders U.S. negotiators had
received, which were themselves impacted by the United States’
perception that it had been slighted in the 1979 negotiations.166
Each side took to the barricades: the United States sought access
to utilities, particularly water, energy, transportation, and

TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 372.
SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 68.
165 TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 374.
166 de Graaf & King, supra note 89, at 441 (explaining that Congress thought
that the United States had lost on “balance of benefits” in the 1979 AGP and that
for that reason Congress had inserted Title VII into the Trade Agreements Act of
1987, which required annual reports on the “level of openness in foreign
procurement markets”).
163
164
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telecommunications;167 the EU, for its part, wanted access to U.S.
sub-federal procurement entities.168 Worse than just assuming
uncompromising positions, each side accused the other of bad faith
and “disputed the value of each other’s offers.”169 They eventually
overcame this impasse by negotiating on a “value-of-opportunities
basis,” using market information put together by consultants at
Deloitte & Touche.170 It was from this report that U.S. negotiators
learned that they were offering only $18 billion in sub-central
procurement in exchange for the EU’s $100 billion in expanded
coverage.171 They had to make a better offer.
Another complication lay behind this dispute. The United States
held that principles of federalism forbade compelling the states to
join the GPA.172 The Europeans seemed to have believed that the
United States could have compelled the states, but had simply
chosen not to.173 There is insufficient space to explore this issue, but
167 TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 372; de Graaf & King, supra note 89, at 442
(reporting that the United States sought “unrestricted access to the strategically
important electrical and telecommunications”).
168 SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 68 (describing the “most heated discussion” on
the EU side was access to sub-federal procurement); de Graaf & King, supra note 89,
at 443 (relating that the EU wanted “unfettered access to state and major city level
procurement in the United States”).
169 TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 374; see also Halford, supra note 75, at 47-48,
n.70 (describing the “wide difference of interpretation about market access” and
relating that U.S. assertions that $150 billion were open to foreign competition was
“suspect and misleading” because of 20% of business must go to small and medium
sized businesses). Perhaps the story that is most emblematic of the mistrust during
the GPA negotiations is that of the U.S. Trade Representative’s report leaked to the
Financial Times, which maintained that the United States had open up $16.8 billion
to European contractors but that EU opened up only $7.8 million to U.S. contractors.
Id. at 47-48.
170 ARROWSMITH, ET AL., supra note 18, at 199.
171 de Graaf & King, supra note 89, at 448, n.56 (citing STUDY OF PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT OPPORTUNITIES (Mar. 22, 1994) (prepared at the request of the EU and
United States)).
172 See Yukins, supra note 7, at 2-3 (explaining the United States “has long
argued that the principles of federalism bar the federal government from
compelling the states to open their procurement markets under an international
agreement”); Leebron, supra note 146, at 176 (recounting that “[o]ne theme
dominated the debate over the Uruguay Round Agreements in the United States,
and this was sovereignty” and that implementation was “controversial”).
173 See ARROWSMITH, ET AL. , supra note 18, at 199 (remarking the United States
“did not want to bind state governments to the GPA without their consent,” not
that it could not do so); see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 154
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suffice it to say that the debate about the extent to which the U.S.
federal government can bind states without their consent via
unratified trade agreements is ongoing.174 (At the present, it appears
that the United States and the EU have at last reached some degree
of mutual understanding on this question.175)
The parties signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in
May 1993, postponing their dispute.176 The EU agreed to open
central government procurement and electrical equipment for
utilities,177 the United States to seek voluntary coverage of subfederal entities.178
Just two days before the signing of the GPA on April 13, 1994,
the parties signed another MOU extending the May 1993 MOU.179
Sharp bargaining throughout meant that mutual concessions were
quid pro quo and “dollar-for-dollar.”180 Such strict reciprocity
(1991) (arguing that federal courts’ enforcement of free-trade agreements belies
argument that federalism precludes enforcement on uncooperative states).
174 See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 403, 421-23 (2003) (arguing based on “new federalism”
jurisprudence the Supreme Court “may no longer assume an inviolable link
between the ability to exercise the treaty power and the authority to legislate
preemptively”); Leebron, supra note 146, at 224-28 (recounting the scholarly and
political debates about how the Uruguay Round Agreement implicates issues of
federalism); Amol Mehra, Note & Comment, Federalism and International Trade: The
Intersection of the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Act and State
“Buy Local” Legislation, 4 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 179, 194-197 (2008) (arguing
that the GPA applies to states only if they consent); Tracey Taylor, The Legislature,
The Governor & International Trade Agreements: An Analysis of Washington Law, at 6
(Office of Program Research, Washington State House of Reps., Dec. 2004),
http://www. leg.wa.gov/House/Committees/CDHT/Documents/JLOCTP.pdf
(explaining the relationship between state and federal law under given that
Washington state is a GPA signatory).
175 Yukins, supra note 7, at 3-4 (suggesting that “while the issue of federalism
is not fully settled . . . informal discussions members of the European procurement
community seem to have accepted the U.S. argument that the federal government
may not compel states to open their markets”).
176 SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 73 (describing the signing of the interim EC-U.S.
MOU in May 2003); cf. Exec. Order No. 12,849, 58 Fed. Reg. 30,931 (May 25, 1993),
available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/
12849.pdf (order implementing the EC-U.S. MOU on government procurement).
177 SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 73.
178 Halford, supra note 75, at 49.
179 SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 74.
180 Id. at 74-75; cf. Marceau & Blank, supra note 10, at 116-17 (recounting the
same conflict).
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resulted not only in reduced coverage but also coverage “beset by a
myriad of derogations vis-à-vis the various signatories.”181 The GPA
thereby “harbours an intra discriminatory trade regime between its
Members[.]”182
The purpose in detailing the negotiations was to illustrate that
coverage was closely bargained. That is because the GPA permits
discrimination against members for procurement contracts not
covered by the GPA,183 and that is precisely what the parties did
during negotiations. Reich explains the significance of the GPA
countenancing such tactics:
This situation, where a major trade barrier is allowed to continue
and flourish, and to distort so much trade between WTO
members, is obviously in conflict with the GATT principle of
181 Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 136-38; see also Kashdan, supra note 11, at 571
(noting coverage negotiations about sub-central entities were marked by a “high
degree of reciprocity”). It is of some consolation, however, that the parties have not
taken a strict sector-by-sector approach to reciprocity but rather have attempted
only a rough balance of opportunities. See ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 110.
182 Reich recounts examples where the tit-for-tat approach produced
undesirable results. The United States, for example, in response to perceived slights
originally denied access to its state governments and electrical utilities to all
signatories except for Israel and South Korea. And at one time, the EU only allowed
Finland and Switzerland access to public transportation and excluded all other
GPA members. See Reich (1997), supra note 59, at 136-37.
183 “The GPA applies only to government procurement covered by the [GPA],
and it bestows national treatment only to products, services and suppliers of other
parties to the GPA.” Reich (1997) supra note 59, at 134, n.70 (citing GPA, Articles I.1
and III.1, supra note 16). Arrowsmith and Anderson explain that “market-opening
commitments under the current GPA do not always apply on [a most-favored
nation] basis, in particular because some concessions are limited by the Parties to
those Parties who themselves offer reciprocal concessions of the same type.” Robert
D. Anderson & Sue Arrowsmith, The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Past,
Present and Future, in ARROWSMITH & ANDERSON, supra note 113, at 20. Anderson
elaborates in another article in the same book co-authored with Osei-Lah:

Party A may exclude certain products or services from its coverage for
particular reasons. In response, Party B, which otherwise covers such
products or services, may restrict access to procurement of such products
and services by its entities with respect to suppliers of Party A, or
otherwise impose other restrictions or derogations with respect to Party
A.
Robert D. Anderson & Kodjo Osei-Lah, The Coverage Negotiations Under the
Agreement on Government Procurement: Context, Mandate, Process and Prospects, in
ARROWSMITH & ANDERSON, supra note 113, at 159.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/6

2015]

HIDDEN STATUTORY BAR

333

trade liberalization and open markets. The fact that this has
occurred . . . serve[s] as a baffling testimony to the immense
domestic interests at stake in this field and the powerful political
forces opposing liberalization of government purchasing.184
Hence, the particular coverage arrangements that resulted did
not come about by accident. Each choice about coverage made
during the negotiations had immediate and reciprocal
consequences.
In the end, the United States persuaded thirty-seven states and
seven of its twenty-four largest cities to enter the GPA voluntarily.185
The thirty-seven states were thought to encompass 80% of state
procurement.186 The federal government granted coverage for
goods, services, and construction.187 On the other side of the ledger,
it retained set aside programs for minorities and small businesses188
and made full use of the national security exception.189
3.4.2. The Revised GPA Negotiations
This subsection gives an overview of the negotiations from 1997
until the Revised GPA became effective in 2014. It next summarizes
the key revisions, and then reviews the increased coverage caused
by the revisions. Lastly, it compares the EU’s demands for increased
coverage of sub-central entities with the final results in the United
States.
The original GPA negotiators foresaw the need to continue
negotiations, and included a provision that talks would begin within
Reich (1997) supra note 59, at 134-35.
SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 74 (noting that among these 37 states the five
largest were California, New York, Illinois, Florida, and Texas and that the seven
cities were Chicago, Detroit, Boston, Dallas, Indianapolis, San Antonio, and
Nashville); see also Scott Sheffler, A Balancing Act: State Participation in Free Trade
Agreements with “Sub-central” Procurement Obligations (forthcoming) (providing a
detailed analysis of the application of the GPA to the 37 U.S. states who are
signatories).
186 de Graaf & King, supra note 89, at 449.
187 SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 74.
188 Id.
189 GPA, Article XXIII.1, supra note 16; BARBOUR, supra note 100, at 46 (citing
GPA, Appendix I, United States, Annex 1, supra note 15) (also citing an example of
the Department of Energy’s exception for safeguarding nuclear materials).
184
185
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three years of signing.190 Thus, informal discussions started in early
1997,191 and a first draft came together in 2003.192 The parties agreed
on negotiation procedures in 2004.193 In 2006, they agreed changes
would not take effect until coverage had been worked out. 194 Five
years of haggling ensued195 and the negotiations continued until a
deal was struck on December 15, 2011.196 The final text was adopted
on March 30, 2012,197 but would not take effect until ten countries
ratified it,198 as a two-thirds majority was required.199 Israel

190 GPA, Article XXIV.7(b), supra note 16; see also GPA Article XXIV.8
(mandating that the parties would consult regularly on necessary modifications
due to changes in information technology).
191 See Anderson & Arrowsmith, supra note 183, at 21.
192 Id. at 22; Anderson & Osei-Lah, supra note 183, at 163.
193 Modalities for the Negotiations on Extension of Coverage and Elimination
of Discriminatory Measures and Practices, GPA/79 (Jul. 19, 2004); see also
Committee on Government Procurement, Report (July 2003 - November 2004) of the
Committee on Government Procurement, ¶ 23, GPA/82, (Dec. 11, 2006) (noting that the
chairman’s suggestion on the negotiations was followed).
194 Committee on Government Procurement, Report of the Committee on
Government Procurement (November 2005 - December 2006), ¶ 20, GPA/89 (Dec. 11,
2006); but see Sue Arrowsmith, The Revised Agreement on Government Procurement:
Changes to the Procedural Rules and Other Transparency Provisions, in ARROWSMITH &
ANDERSON, supra note 113, at 285 [hereinafter Arrowsmith (2011)] (explaining that
a revised text was provisionally adopted in 2006 to facilitate new accessions).
195 Anderson & Osei-Lah, supra note 183, at 165-66.
196 See EU, Japan Wrestle With Final GPA Deal, While EU, U.S. Narrow Differences,
29 INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Narrow Differences] (describing
“daily” conversations between U.S. and EU ambassadors in Geneva to “hammer
out the final terms” until just weeks before the agreement’s signing).
197 Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government Procurement (Mar. 30,
2012), GPA/113, available at http:// www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/
gp_gpa_e.htm#negotiations [hereinafter Revised GPA]; Decision on the Outcomes
of the Negotiations under Article XXIV § 7 of the Agreement on Government
Procurement, GPA/112, ¶ 5 (December 16, 2011); see also Ping Wang, The Renewed
Momentum for the Expansion of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, 4 PUB.
PROC. L. REV. NA157 (2012) (recapping the last four months of approval process).
198 Although there are currently 43 GPA member states, all 28 EU member
states count as one country for purposes of ratification. See notes 104 and 109-111,
supra (listing original and new signatory states). Therefore, ten countries must
ratify.
199 Originally, the plan was to have the Revised GPA ratified by a two-thirds
majority not later than the WTO ministerial conference in Bali, Indonesia, on 3-6
December 2013, but those plans had to be postponed because only one GPA
member country (Lichtenstein) had completed ratification as of October 30, 2013.
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supplied the tenth vote,200 and the Revised GPA came into force on
April 6, 2014.201
“The revised text,” Anderson and Arrowsmith say, “is in no
sense a radical revision[.]”202 Mostly, it “streamlined and
modernized” the GPA,203 and “carrie[d] over a large number of the
existing Agreement’s provisions, albeit in modified and more easily
understood form.”204 Its “aim” was “streamlining, simplifying or
clarifying the text, providing more flexibility or, as appropriate,
more transparency, and/or bringing the text up to date to reflect
Among its most striking
new practical developments.”205
developments are new provisions on corruption, transparency, and
good governance, which are far removed from the WTO’s
traditionally singled-minded emphasis on free trade.206
The provision on challenge procedures corresponding to GPA
Article XX is Revised GPA Article XVIII.1. There are several minor
changes to Article XX.207 Most significant here, however, is the tacit
Revised GPA Will Not Enter into Force by Bali due to Ratification Shortfall, 31 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Nov. 8, 2013).
200 Timothy Keeler & Kelsey M. Rule, Revisions to WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement Enter into Force, MONDAQ (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://mondaq.com/ (reporting that Israel adopted the Revised GPA on March 7,
2014).
201 Id.
202 Anderson & Arrowsmith, supra note 183, at 23.
203 Keeler & Rule, supra note 200.
204 Arrowsmith (2011), supra note 194, at 287.
205 Id. at 288.
206 Id. at 287-88 (describing “innovative new provisions which refer to conflicts
of interest and corruption” as well as “more transparency”); Robert D. Anderson,
The Conclusion of the Renegotiation of the World Trade Organization Agreement on
Government Procurement: What It Means for the Agreement and for the World Economy,
3 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 83, 90-92 (2012) (arguing that “the revised GPA text, the
Agreement has to an extent been re-framed to respond directly to current concerns
regarding good governance in addition to its core role in maintaining open
markets”); Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer & Mintewab Gebre Woldesenbet, The
Revised Agreement on Government Procurement and Corruption, 47 J. WORLD TRADE
1129, 1130 (2013) (noting that the Revised GPA is the first WTO document to use the
word “corruption” and to address such concerns directly).
207 The GPA labels this section “Challenge Procedures,” whereas the Revised
GPA calls the section “Domestic Review” procedures. There are a number of other
changes of this nature. Compare GPA, Article XX.2, supra note 16 (showing the
original language) with Revised GPA, Article XVIII.1, supra note 197 (revising the
text to read “Domestic Review”).
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acknowledgement that not all members would grant private parties
a right to challenge under the Revised GPA. Article XVIII.1(b)
provides that foreign suppliers may use a State’s domestic challenge
procedures “where the supplier does not have a right to challenge
directly a breach of the Agreement under the domestic law of a
Party, a failure to comply with a Party’s measures implementing this
Agreement[.]”208 It seems this provision may have been adopted to
recognize what had been implicitly understood during the original
GPA negotiations – namely, that granting direct challenges under
the GPA was not required, so long as the private parties are afforded
an adequate forum under domestic challenge procedures.
The transition from GPA Article XX to Revised GPA Article
XVIII.1 was uneventful as the latter merely memorialized what the
member states had always intended.209 Their intention, it seems,
was that while members could elect not to grant foreign suppliers
direct challenge rights, implementing legislation was required to
afford parties substantive and procedural rights as if they had done
so. This must have been their intention or else Article XX would

See supra notes 154-162, and accompanying text.
When interpreting treaties in the United States, the parties’ intention is
paramount. Elsewhere, the text controls. See JACKSON, supra note 9, at 165
(explaining that “most countries interpret international agreements in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of the text” and that “the object and purpose of the
agreement is merely ancillary”). For U.S. courts, the “prime objective of
interpretation . . . is to ascertain the meaning intended by the contracting parties.”
Id. at 165-66 (reporting that the rule favoring the intention of the parties over the
language of the agreement in the interpretation of treaties “has been repeatedly
sanctioned by the Supreme Court”) (citing Sumitomo Shoji America v. Avagliano, 457
U.S. 176 (1982); Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963); Pigeon River Improvement
Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Fox, 291 U.S. 138 (1934)).
208
209
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have been to no purpose210 and members could simply opt out of
their obligations.211
The Revised GPA added between $80 and $100 billion to the $1
trillion to coverage.212 Members included more than 200 new
entities.213 Several lowered their thresholds,214 and for the first time
all members agreed to robust coverage of construction.215 Though
not insignificant, this was far less than what the EU had hoped for.
They entered into discussions “seeking a major expansion in
coverage.”216 Negotiations again faltered in 2007 when the EU
210 It would be mistaken to conclude that Article XX of the GPA was written
only to be ignored for two reasons. First, treaties should not be read in a manner
that “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 60, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. [Hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Reading Article XX as if it were
written to be ignored would be absurd. Second, the Vienna Convention’s general
rule of interpretation is that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context[.]” Id., art. 32 (emphasis added). Interpreting the words of a treaty “in their
context” entails applying the rule against surplusage, which holds that an
interpretation that would render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless
should be rejected. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174-79 (2012) (defining the rule of surplusage);
Stephen M. Schwebel, May Preparatory Work Be Used to Correct Rather Than Confirm
the “Clear” Meaning of a Treaty Provision?, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 545 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996) (noting that this
rule is also “a canon of treaty interpretation”). Although the United States is not a
signatory to the Vienna Convention, it does hold that portions “constitute
customary international law on the law of treaties.” U.S. Department of State,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, available at http://
www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm.
211 Article XX was an unambiguous obligation of the WTO GPA. As with all
treaties and international agreements, the parties have specific obligations to cosignatories to comply with the terms of the agreement and concerning the
procedures for modifying or withdrawing from the agreement. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 210, at art. 26 (good faith performance), art. 27 (may not rely
on internal law to justify nonperformance); art. 39 (“treaty may be amended [only]
by agreement between the parties”), art. 65 (withdrawal procedure). The GPA is
no exception and sets forth procedures for complying with, amending, and
withdrawing from the agreement. See GPA, supra note 16, art. XXIV.5
(implementing legislation); art. XXIV.9 (amendments); art. XXIV.10 (withdrawal).
212 Anderson 2012, supra note 206, at 84.
213 Id. at 84-85.
214 Id. at 85 (mentioning Japan, Korea, and Aruba).
215 Id.
216 Anderson & Osei-Lah, supra note 183, at 170-71 (explaining that there was
a “significant gap in aspirations” between the EU and the other major parties).
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complained that the United States had failed to “put anything
significant on the table.”217 Just like the 1993 negotiations, the EU
sought greater access to sub-central procurement.218 Ultimately, the
EU lowered its expectations, withdrawing its 2008 offer when the
United States and other major parties would not match it.219
The United States’ contribution was, perhaps, especially
disappointing. It added eleven federal entities, but not one state or
municipality.220 The United States added only $4-4.5 billion to the
$400 billion already covered under the GPA, or 1% of its coverage.221
Though this may be of small consolation, it was not for lack of effort
or bad faith,222 but stemmed from the obstacles associated with
federalism described above.223 From the EU’s perspective, this was,
nonetheless, a modest offer coming from the second largest GPA
member. The Europeans elected to move forward with talks
anyway.224 Their aspirations for better access to the United States’
sub-central markets may resurface during TTIP negotiations. It is
unlikely that they have given up.

217 U.S., EU Spar Over WTO Government Procurement Pact, Miss Deadline, 25
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Dec. 21. 2007) (describing “tense discussion[s]” between the
United States and EU).
218 See RAJ BHALA, Modern GATT Law 969-71 (2013) (relating that the Europeans
demanded, in particular, that the United States extend coverage to the 13 states not
subject to the GPA); Narrow Differences, supra note 196.
219 New EU Offer in GPA Talks Will Scale Back Ambition, but Talks Advance, 28
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Scale Back Ambition].
220 Jean Heilman Grier, Background: New Procurement Opportunities Under
Revised GPA, PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE (Mar. 17, 2014), available at
http://trade.djaghe. com/?p=488.
221 See U.S. Commitments in Revised GPA Expand Coverage by Roughly 1 Percent,
30 INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Jan. 13, 2012).
222 See Documents Show USTR Made Last-Ditch Effort to Sign Up States to GPA,
30 INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 17, 2012) (recounting the United States Trade
Representative’s failed efforts to secure consent from Georgia, West Virginia, New
Jersey, and North Carolina).
223 See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text. But see Leebron, supra note
146, at 224-31 (recounting the lengthy federalism debate over the URAA and the
sides taken by various academics and suggesting this is more a political issue than
a genuine constitutional issue because of the “broad legal powers of the federal
government”).
224 See Scale Back Ambition, supra note 219.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/6

2015]

HIDDEN STATUTORY BAR

339

4. A STATUTORY BAR AND THE FUTURE OF TTIP NEGOTIATIONS

Having presented the necessary background on the alphabet
soup of the WTO, AGP, GPA, Revised GPA, and TTIP, this section
now engages the main argument: namely, that the United States’
statutory bar to domestic challenges required under both the GPA,
Article XX, and the Revised GPA, Article XVIII.1 could prove an
obstacle to TTIP negotiations.225
Subsection A details the statutory bar’s sources. Subsection B
explains why that may be a bone of contention during TTIP
negotiations.
Before proceeding, two considerations about the statutory bar
on private actions bear mentioning, and the ramifications of each are
discussed in corresponding footnotes. First, the statutory bar is
hardly unique to the GPA, but extends to all of the United States’
legislation implementing the WTO (i.e., the URAA).226 Second, the
bar on private actions is not unique to the WTO, but extends to other
free-trade agreement such as NAFTA.227
225 For that matter, the fact that the URAA did not grant private parties the
right bring complaints under the original GPA when that was required under
Article XX and was apparently understood in that way during the 1993 negotiations
may also affect TTIP negotiations. The Revised GPA has barely taken effect in
March 2014; any injuries to aggrieved suppliers before that would, presumably, be
governed by the original GPA.
226 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1); see also note 241 infra (raising a question about
whether the argument favoring removal of the statutory bar to private actions
under the GPA should be extended to implement the WTO more broadly. Though
this will probably not happen. Under the sovereign acts doctrine in the United
States, there is a distinction between the government’s distinct roles as buyer and
sovereign. Similarly, this Article submits that unlike other challenges under the
WTO (for which private actions may be ill suited), granting private challenges
under the GPA is important since “private attorneys general” may be uniquely
situated to challenge the government’s abuses and shortcomings when it is acting
a buyer). See, e.g., Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer & Jean-Francois Richard,
The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by
Protest, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21 (1991) (arguing disappointed bidders “may be
characterized as private attorneys general because they have incentives to detect
and prosecute actions by procurement officials that are contrary to the public
interest.”). Government procurement is a special case; this Article does not
advocate removing the bar on all private actions that could be brought under the
WTO.
227 A similar bar on private actions has been included in every act
implementing a free trade agreement. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (establishing that
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4.1. The United States Does Not Provide a Forum for Aggrieved
Foreign Suppliers to Challenge Violations of the GPA.
When the GPA was negotiated, it was widely held that the
United States would need few if any changes to implement the
GPA.228 Whereas the GPA establishes only basic requirements for a
only the United States government has a cause of action under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), specifically prohibiting “private remedies”); but
see Patricia Isela Hansen, Dispute Settlements in the NAFTA and Beyond, 40 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 417, 419 (2005) (arguing NAFTA provides a model for other trade agreements
because although it did not create private remedies, it established binding arbitral
awards requiring national governments to pay for violations of the agreement, thus
raising the question about whether this Article’s advocacy for private action should
be extended to other free trade agreements). This Article argues (a) that during the
original GPA negotiations in early 1990s the United States may have left its partners
with the impression that it would grant private parties standing to challenge
procurements under the GPA and (b) that there are costs associated with flouting
that (tacit) agreement. Whether the United States should reassess or amend its
implementing legislation for other free trade agreements depends on (c) what was
said during negotiations, including (d) whether specific commitments were made
that the implementing legislation does not deliver on, and (e) what consequences
may follow from reneging on such commitments. This Article does not delve into
legal or moral reasons that may favor removing the statutory bar. Its approach is
mainly descriptive. Insofar as it makes normative arguments, it does so based on
practical considerations. Specifically, it argues that the bar may have the
unintended consequence of derailing TTIP and, thus, ought to be reconsidered.
Whether to amend the bar to private causes of action under free trade agreements
(e.g., NAFTA) ought to be evaluated in like manner: What did the United States
promise? If a bar was not envisioned, would it be it in the national interest to correct
any misunderstandings? Et cetera. Such questions are worth pondering, but are
well beyond the scope of this Article.
228 See Kashdan, supra note 11, at 562, 573 (holding that “[r]elatively little
legislation was needed . . . since the waiver of the Buy American Act and Balance
of Payments Program could be accomplished relatively simply, and U.S.
procurement procedures already were consistent with the obligations imposed
under the [GPA]” and that the URAA was only a “relatively minor” change to
existing law); Joseph Francois, Douglas Nelson & N. David Palmeter, Public
Procurement in the United States: A Post-Uruguay Round Perspective, in HOEKMAN &
MAVROIDIS (1997), supra note 84, at 106 (relating that implementation “required only
minor changes in federal law”); Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence
and Opportunity: The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement
Reform, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 303, 345–46 (1998) (writing that federal
procurement laws and regulations already complied with the GPA for the most part
and required only a few changes, that it already had transparent procedures, and
that the GPA was instead “aimed at countries without such procedures”). This
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government procurement system,229 the United States already had a
procurement system that many considered the “envy of the
world.”230 What was there to amend?231
Yet U.S. federal law falls short in at least one respect,232 and this
affects the remedies available to suppliers at federal, state, and local
Article is not, however, the first to observe that the URAA imperfectly implements
the various WTO agreements. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 146, at 212 (noting that
“many aspects of the agreement were not explicitly implemented by the
legislation”).
229 Arrowsmith helpfully cites sources describing the measures taken to
conform with the GPA in several countries. See ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15,
at 384 n.97.
230 See, e.g., Politicizing Procurement: Will President Obama’s Proposal Curb Free
Speech and Hurt Small Business?: J. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business , 112th Cong. 103 (2011) (written
testimony of Daniel I. Gordon, Adm’r For Fed. Procurement Policy at the Office of
Mgmt. and Budget, stating that the United States’ acquisition system is the “envy
of the world”); REICH (1999), supra note 79, at 128 (explaining that the United States’
procurement system was considered an exception).
231 That is not to say that the GPA is so specific that it requires that a particular
sort of system be implemented. Arrowsmith explains, “There is a great diversity
between GPA parties in the types of bodies (if any) that have been entrusted with
the task of reviewing procurement decisions” and lists common law countries
where procurement cases are heard before courts of general jurisdiction and civil
law countries which have “created specialist tribunals or other review bodies that
deal wholly or mainly with procurement” ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 39394. “The GPA recognises the diversity of national legal traditions,” she concludes,
“and leaves considerable discretion for states to determine the forum and
procedure for review.” Id. at 394. Article XX sets minimal requirements, and then
leaves the details to the member states. Id. at 394-95.
232 U.S. federal law may fall short in other ways as well.
For example,
subcontractors’ rights to bring actions are limited, and such actions can be brought
only through the sponsorship of a prime contractor with privity of contract with
the government. See, e.g., RALPH C. NASH, JR., KAREN R. O’BRIEN-DEBAKEY & STEVEN
L. SCHOONER, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT 477-78 (4th ed. 2013). By contrast, it does
not appear subcontractors’ rights are limited in the same manner under the GPA.
See, e.g., REICH (1999), supra note 78, at 308 (explaining that the GPA adopted a
“broad definition” of legal standing that “would appear to allow not only main
contractors to file challenges, but also potential sub-contractors”); ARROWSMITH
(2003), supra note 15, at 391-93 (arguing that while “supplier” is undefined, the
“better view” is that the word has a “broader meaning, extending to any firm
engaged in supplying works, supplies or services, whether as a main contractor,
subcontractor, or operating further down the supply chain”); Xinglin Zhang,
Constructing a system of challenge procedures to comply with the Agreement on
Government Procurement, See comment in ARROWSMITH & ANDERSON, supra note 113,
at 501-03 (arguing the requirement for challenge procedures applies to
subcontractors as well as prime contractors). While there are surely other ways the

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

342

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

levels.233 Among the GPA’s minimum standards is a requirement
that member states provide access to a forum where aggrieved
suppliers can challenge “alleged breaches of the [GPA] arising in the
context of procurements in which they have, or have had, an
interest.”234 The Revised GPA makes a similar provision.235 This is
not the same as providing access to domestic award challenge
forums. Instead, Article XX.2 guarantees suppliers from member
states not only the right to challenge particular awards under
domestic law but also the right to challenge the domestic system’s
compliance with the GPA.236 U.S. legislation unequivocally bars the
latter.237 And there is not, therefore, a single forum at any level of
U.S. government where a foreign supplier can challenge breaches of
the GPA.238
United States may fall short of the GPA requirements, a full exploration is beyond
the scope of this Article.
233 The United States has been “restrictive” in its implementing legislation
since the Tokyo Round negotiations. Leebron, supra note 146, at 213. What is new,
however, “is the attempt to circumscribe the effect of the law itself.” Id. Congress
sought to “greatly limit the extent to which the [URAA] may be interpreted to alter
any existing laws.” Id. Leebron explains, “instead of choosing to grease the path to
compliance, Congress to a considerable degree chose to put stones on it.” Id. at 214.
In a word, Congress chose a “minimalist approach to implementation: if the
provisions of its law were not clearly in violation of the WTO agreements as the
United States interpreted them, the United States took no legislative action.” Id. at
234 (emphasis added). Especially with regard to federalism and other politically
sensitive areas “the approach was one of ‘wait and see’: wait to see if in fact violations
develop and whether they are challenged by other parties to the WTO.” Id.
(emphasis added). Although “in most contexts the United States took the steps
required to bring it into compliance,” he concludes, “a number of provisions in the
implementing legislation [i.e., URAA] which appear not to be in full compliance
with the WTO agreements.” Id.
234 GPA, Article XX.2, supra note 16. One limitation of the analysis of this
provision, however, is that there has been “[n]o jurisprudence or decision of a
competent WTO body.” WTO Analytical Index: Agreement On Government
Procurement, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ booksp_e/analytic_index_e/
gpa_02_e.htm#article20B.
235 Revised GPA, Article XVIII.1, supra note 197 (providing that a private party
may bring an action “arising in the context of a covered procurement, in which the
supplier has, or has had, an interest”).
236 Id.
237 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (2011). This Article is not the first to note the effect
of this provision. See Tiefer, supra note 7, at 44-46; Schaefer, supra note 7, at 639.
238 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B) (2011) (forbidding any private causes of action
under the GPA to challenges state or local procurement procedures or decisions);
see also Leebron, supra note 146, at 242 (criticizing Congress for expanding the
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Only one legal “person” can challenge violations of the WTO
agreement: “the United States.”239 Under the URAA,240 which,
again, applies not only to subsidiary agreements such as the GPA
but also to the WTO generally,241 suppliers cannot seek “private
remedies.”242 No one else may “challenge” agency decisions “on the
grounds that such action . . . is inconsistent with [the GPA].”243
Actions under the GPA against state and local governments are also
barred.244 For those who doubted its motivations, Congress
explained that its intention was to preclude “any person other than
the United States from bringing actions” under the GPA.245 For easy
reference, the full text of 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) is provided below.246
President’s trade authority and encouraging trade agreements “while
simultaneously closing United States courts to those wishing to challenge actions
of the state or federal government as violative of international commitments”).
239 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (2011) (proscribing private causes of action by holding
that “[n]o person other than the United States” can bring action under the GPA);
Leebron, supra note 146, at 212 (explaining that there is no private cause of action
under the URAA).
240 Pub. L. 103-465, Dec. 8, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809; 19 U.S.C. § 3501, et seq.
241 19 U.S.C. § 3511(a) (approving the trade agreements listed in subsection (d)
of this section); 19 U.S.C. § 3511(d)(17) (listing the GPA as an agreement “annexed
to” the WTO agreement). See also Leebron, supra note 146, at 206 (explaining that
the URAA did not distinguish between the multilateral and the plurilateral
agreements).
242 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512(c)(1) and (c)(2).
243 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B).
244 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B) (prohibiting private actions against state
governments and “any political subdivision of a State,” which would include city
and local government).
245 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(2).
246 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) provides as follows:
(c) Effect of agreement with respect to private remedies
(1) Limitations
No person other than the United States—
(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of such an
agreement, or
(B) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law,
any action or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality
of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State on
the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with such
agreement.
(2) Intent of Congress
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In addition to the specific prohibition of private actions under
the GPA, Congress also included a general prohibition on utilizing
inconsistencies between domestic law and the GPA. 19 U.S.C. §
3512(a)(1) provides: “No provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements . . . that is inconsistent with any law of the United States
shall have effect.”247 This has become known as the URAA’s
“supremacy clause.”248
Finally, apart from insulating states and local agencies from
litigation for breaches of the GPA,249 the URAA-implementing
legislation also “failed to specify state obligations[.]”250 The
consequences of shielding states and local agencies run counter to
the purposes of the GPA and are considered below. Suffice it to say
that this is precisely where foreign competition would have been
most useful and where the EU has expressed the most interest.

It is the intention of the Congress through paragraph (1) to occupy the
field with respect to any cause of action or defense under or in connection
with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including by precluding any
person other than the United States from bringing any action against any
State or political subdivision thereof or raising any defense to the
application of State law under or in connection with any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements—
(A) on the basis of a judgment obtained by the United States in an action
brought under any such agreement; or
(B) on any other basis.
19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2011).
See Filicia Davenport, Note, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Supremacy
Clause: Congressional Preclusion of the Charming Betsy Standard with Respect to WTO
Agreements, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 281-82 (2005) (noting that Congress “expressly
forbade any judicial deference to conflicts between domestic statutes and the WTO
agreements in a section known as the URAA Supremacy Clause”); Raj Bhala,
Equilibrium Theory, the FICAS Model, and International Banking Law, 38 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 1, 16 (1997) (explaining that “Congress inserted in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act a supremacy clause: in the event of an inconsistency between
United States law and a provision in a Uruguay Round agreement, the former takes
precedence over the latter”).
249 See Leebron, supra note 146, at 228–229 (explaining that in “sweeping
language” Congress declared “[n]o state law, or its application, may be declared
invalid on the basis that it violates the [WTO] except in an action brought by the
federal government specifically for that purpose”).
250 Id. at 230 (explaining that “reluctance to impinge on state activity resulted
in inaction in cases where [state] implementing provisions were arguably
required”).
247
248
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The following example illustrates the problem. Article III
prohibits discrimination against foreign suppliers.251 Member states
may at any time after accession enact laws or regulations that are
inconsistent with this requirement and which are not exempted in
their accession agreements. Suppose that the United States passed
a law called the Always Buy American Act (“ABAA”), which unlike
the real Buy American Act does not exempt partners in free-trade
agreements or the GPA.252 Suppose also that Airbus lost an award
to build an airplane for the U.S. Air Force only because Boeing is a
domestic supplier and the ABAA says agencies must favor such
domestic suppliers. Airbus could protest at the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the Court of Federal Claims (COFC),

251 This is just one example. There are any number of ways that member states
could breach their duties. They may engage in bid splitting tactics to avoid
thresholds (Article II, Valuation of Contracts); they may neglect their duties to
developing countries (Article V, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing
Countries); they may word specifications in order to favor domestic firms (Article
VI, Technical Specifications); they may share information with domestic firms to
give them a leg up (Article VII, Tendering Procedures); they may tinker with
qualifications to render foreign firms uncompetitive (Article VIII, Qualification of
Suppliers); they may to inadequately advertise (Article IX, Invitation to Participate
Regarding Intended Procurement); they may fail to notify foreign firms of
opportunities to be included on short lists of qualified suppliers (Article X, Selection
Procedures); they may set deadlines that would be unrealistic for foreign
competitors (Article XI, Time-limits for Tendering and Delivery); they may choose
a native language that would preclude foreign competition (Article XII, Tender
Documentation); they may open bids early and share those bids with domestic
firms to undercut foreign competitors (Article XIII, Submission, Receipt and
Opening of Tenders and Awarding of Contracts); they may violate a party’s
confidentiality during negotiations to favor a local firm (Article XIV, Negotiation);
or they may grant sole-source contracts without justification (Article XV, Limited
Tendering). Any of these may comply with domestic law but would certainly fail
under the GPA, and that is why Article XX grants parties the right to directly
challenge awards under the GPA.
252 JOHN CIBINIC, JR., RALPH C. NASH, JR. & CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS, FORMATION
OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1624-26 (2011) (explaining that the application of the
Buy American Act was waived by an executive order implementing one provision
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2511(a) (authorizing the
President to waive any otherwise applicable “law, regulation, procedure or practice
regarding Government procurement” that would accord foreign products less
favorable treatment than that given to domestic products); Exec. Order No. 12,260,
46 Fed. Reg. 1653 (Dec. 31, 1980)).
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or both;253 neither forum discriminates based on nationality254 and
both regularly hear protests brought by foreign suppliers.255 But
supposing that these forums uphold the ABAA, the award will
stand. What could Airbus do?
The GPA promises aggrieved suppliers the right to challenge
“breaches” of the GPA,256 and this hypothetical presents such a
breach.257 But U.S. law bars private actions in such cases. Two
options remain. Like its predecessor, the GPA provides a forum for
inter-governmental negotiation.258 It also grants recourse to the
WTO’s Dispute Resolution Understanding forum.259 What it does
253 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (granting COFC jurisdiction over contract
claims brought by “interested part[ies]” and not limiting such claims to domestic
firms); Fed. Cl. R., App. C. (Aug. 30, 2013), Procedure in Procurement Protest Cases
(Court of Federal Claims rules not specifying that the parties cannot be foreign
contractors in procedure procurement protest cases).
254 Corr & Zissis, supra note 228, at 311-13, 353 (explaining that an aggrieved
“multinational supplier” “may pursue relief through various U.S. remedial
processes”).
255 See, e.g., Supreme Food Service GmbH, B-405400.6, et al. (Comp. Gen. Mar. 27,
2013), available at http://www. gao.gov/assets/660/653510.pdf (Swiss firm
protesting bid at GAO); Supreme Food Service GmbH, 112 Fed. Cl. 402 (2013) (same
Swiss firm protesting the same award at COFC following an unsuccessful protest
at GAO).
256 See GPA, Article XX.2, supra note 16; the full text is as follows:

Each Party shall provide non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and
effective procedures enabling suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of
the Agreement arising in the context of procurements in which they have,
or have had, an interest.
257 See GPA, Article III(1)(a), supra note 16 (providing that member states “shall
provide immediately and unconditionally” foreign suppliers of other member
states “treatment no less favourable than” that “accorded to domestic . . .
suppliers”).
258 See AGP (1988), Article VII, supra note 73 (establishing system of intergovernmental discussions); GPA, Article XXII, supra note 16 (retaining the system
of inter-governmental discussions); see also Footer, supra note 150, at 88-91
(explaining that the GPA “basically retains” the AGP’s inter-governmental dispute
settlement system).
259 See WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Understanding on the Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra note 16 (establishing the DSU’s basic
rules); GPA, Article XXII, supra note 16 (providing that the DSU applies to GPA
disputes). For explanations about the DSU’s application to the GPA see
ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 358-71; REICH (1999), supra note 78, at 312-15;
Davies, supra note 86, at 116-123. “In the area of public procurement,” however,
“recourse to the DSU has been vastly less extensive than individual bid challenges
before national authorities.” Robert D. Anderson, William E. Kovacic & Anna
Caroline Müller, Ensuring Integrity and Competition in Public Procurement Markets: A
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not provide, however, is a substitute for GPA Article XX’s private
cause of action. Airbus can complain and it can lobby EU politicians
in hopes that European diplomats or trade negotiators will seek
some form of redress from the United States.260 But it can do little
else.261
This example illustrates one problem with the URAA from an
individual supplier’s perspective. But there is a deeper problem.
The GPA’s challenge procedures were established for more than
protecting the interests of posh European aerospace manufacturers.
“The main objective of the GPA,” Mavroidis and Hoekman explain,
“has always been – and remains – to subject government
procurement to international competition.”262 Granting firms
standing to protect their private interests was primarily a means to
that end.263 By limiting complaints of GPA violations, the URAA to
some degree insulates U.S. government procurement at all levels
Dual Challenge for Good Governance, in ARROWSMITH & ANDERSON, supra note 112, at
696-97. Though perhaps underutilized, the authors argue the DSU “nonetheless
represents an essential complement to individual bid challenges as a mechanism
for considering systemic matters that may not be adequately addressed in
individual bid challenges.” (citing Mitsuo Matsushita, Major WTO Dispute Cases
Concerning Government Procurement, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 299,
305-12 (2006)) (reviewing international disputes under the AGP and the GPA).
260 See ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 379 (explaining that while private
parties are excluded from the DSU, “member states may provide for private parties
to be involved in the government’s decision on whether to invoke the DSU
procedures against another state”).
261 See ARROWSMITH (2005), supra note 96, at 1337 (explaining that if the parties
do not pass implementing legislation then intergovernmental discussions are the
“sole legal recourse”).
262 Mavroidis & Hoekman, supra note 76, at 63. Its loftier concerns may also
include “good government,” increased participation by multinational firms, and
“protecting the integrity of the procurement system.” Gordon, supra note 85, at 430–
31. Arrowsmith adds that better enforcement produces “greater certainty and
predictability in the application of agreed trade rules” which “encourages
governments and private traders to rely on the rules” and the realization of the
economic benefits of the liberal trade rules. ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at
380, 402–03.
263 That point should not be overstated. Article XX’s main purpose was to
promote the greater good, but it was also supposed to eliminate “individual cases
of discriminatory practices by governments against private foreign suppliers” on a
case by case basis. REICH (1999), supra note 78, at 127. The rationale “for allowing
disappointed bidders to protest comes from multiple sources, serving multiple—
and not necessarily consistent—goals.” Gordon, supra note 85, at 430. One such
goals is that disappointed bidders ought to have a forum in which to seek relief. Id.
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from international competition, thereby undermining the GPA’s
core purpose.
Finally, it is particularly significant that the URAA prohibits
private challenges under the GPA at state and local forums.264 It may
be that the federal challenge system works well enough that any
harm from denying a direct challenge under the GPA is merely
fanciful or academic.265 Even if that is true,266 state and local
governments’ procurement forums are a different story. Many are
far less competitive and transparent than the federal system.267 Even
their compliance with the minimum standards is questionable,
which brings about foreseeable consequences; namely that
competition will suffer.268 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that
corruption is rife.269 Thus, both foreign suppliers and domestic
taxpayers lose from an uncompetitive system rewarding local
suppliers at the expense of the public fisc.270 On the whole, everyone
is worse off.
264 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B) (forbidding private parties from bringing an action
under the GPA in any state forum “or any political subdivision of a State”).
265 See, e.g., Politicizing Procurement: Will President Obama’s Proposal Curb Free
Speech and Hurt Small Business?: J. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business , 112th Cong. 103 (2011) (written
testimony of Daniel I. Gordon, Adm’r For Fed. Procurement Policy at the Office of
Mgmt. and Budget, stating that the United States’ acquisition system is the “envy
of the world”).
266 It is not the case that the U.S. federal procurement system is without fault
or would not benefit from the crucible of foreign competition. See, e.g., Jessica
Fickey, Fraud in the Bidding Process: The Limited Remedies Available to Contractors, 38
PUB. CONT. L.J. 913, 914-15 (2009) (describing prosecutions for fraud involving
bribes and kickbacks to secure public contracts, and arguing that private firms who
lose out due to such fraud are often left without meaningful compensation even
after bringing a damages claim).
267 For every Maryland there is an Alabama. See Keith M. Lusby, Improving the
Effectiveness of State Bid Protest Forums: Going Above and Beyond the Agreement on
Government Procurement and Adopting the ABA’s Model Procurement Code, 43 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 57, 64-66, 69-71 (2013) (comparing the ineffective bid challenge system in
Alabama with the more effective bid challenge system in Maryland).
268 See supra text accompanying note 98 (explaining methods that can be taken
to maximize competition).
269 See, e.g., Robert A. Mullins, Corruption in Municipal Procurement: Foreclosing
Challenges of Disappointed Bidders–Augusta, Georgia, and the Need for Reform, 42 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 281, 282-83, 294-99, 303-04 (2013) (attributing the “[p]olitical favoritism
and discriminatory enforcement of procurement regulations [that] run rampant in
Augusta” to a broken procurement system).
270 See, e.g., Kingsley S. Osei, The Best of Both Worlds: Reciprocal Preference and
Punitive Retaliation in Public Contracts, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 715, 716-22 (2011)
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It also bears mentioning that even if U.S. state and local
governments comply with the GPA’s standards for challenge
procedures, they may still violate the national treatment principle.
This principle may require more than the minimum standards for
challenge procedures set forth in GPA Article XX or the Revised
GPA Article XVIII.1. That is, to the extent state and local
governments afford domestic suppliers more ample challenge
procedures than those required under the GPA, foreign suppliers
must receive no less than their domestic counterparts.271 Given the
uncompetitive and un-transparent environment at the state and
local levels, it seems likely that foreign suppliers are not always
given their due privileges under the national treatment principle.
4.2. Reciprocal Access to Government Procurement Markets
This subsection argues that the statutory bar against bringing
private actions under the GPA could be a deal breaker for TTIP
negotiations. In doing so, it reviews the three premises underlying
this argument. First, it returns to the GPA negotiations in 1993 and
examines how coverage details mattered then. Second, it explains
how the statutory bar to private litigation is a violation of the GPA.
Third, it considers what Europeans’ perspectives may be on the
statutory bar, given their position at the recent Revised GPA
negotiations and the ongoing TTIP negotiations.
4.2.1. The GPA Negotiations in 1993
If the histrionic negotiations in 1993 are any guide, the statutory
bar may be a significant issue in the TTIP negotiations. That is the
(describing American governmental entities’ use of protectionist policies; the
“widespread practice . . . . [of] adopt[ing] arbitrary bid price distortion and
procurement preferences that favor their resident bidders over out-of-state or
foreign bidders”).
271 See ARROWSMITH (2005), supra note 96, at 1333–34 (explaining that the
national treatment principle requires that foreign suppliers “should enjoy rights no
less favourable tha[n] those of domestic providers . . . even when the rights of
domestic firms go beyond the specific minimum requirements on . . . remedies set
out in the GPA”).
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case for two reasons. First, the 1993 negotiations were a close-run
fight about coverage. Both sides were determined to give no more
than they got.272 The statutory bar to private actions may seem like
a collateral issue, but at its core, it concerns coverage. The fight over
coverage was the most challenging issue under negotiation in 1993,
and it remains among the most challenging issues under negotiation
for the TTIP.
The statutory bar on private action removes an important
enforcement mechanism and thereby undermines meaningful
access to U.S. procurement markets. A constant refrain in this
Article has been that EU negotiators will demand not only access to
markets, but that such access be meaningful, which surely entails
access to a forum to challenge breaches of the GPA.273 Here lies the
link between coverage and the right to bring a private action. When
the EU fully grasps that the United States did not deliver on its
commitment to abide by one of the GPA’s most basic principles, a
contentious fight may follow.
Second, the EU’s main concern during the 1993 negotiations
was not just for coverage generally but for coverage of U.S. subcentral markets.274 That is significant since the statutory bar
potentially has a disproportionate impact on these markets. This is
because many U.S. state and local governments lack the sort of
robust award challenge procedures and forums which are available
at the federal level.275 Thus, the statutory bar deprives foreign
suppliers of a challenge forum where it matters most. From the
European perspective, this exacerbates their longstanding
complaint about inadequate access to sub-central procurement
markets. They want more than just access to U.S. markets, they want
meaningful access, which would include the right to a private cause
of action at all levels of government; especially at the state and local
level where the U.S. system is, perhaps, least transparent and fair.
So ultimately, this is a fight about coverage without fully functional
272 TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 374; SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 74-75;
Marceau & Blank, supra note 10, at 116-17.
273 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 86, 89, and 90 (explaining that
effectiveness of remedies will greatly affect challenges to breaches).
274 See SCHOTT, supra note 103, at 68; de Graaf & King, supra note 91, at 443;
TREPTE (2004), supra note 75, at 374; Halford, supra note 75, at 47 n.70.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 228-230 (describing efforts to conform
the GPA with multiple countries and praising the procurement system of the U.S.
Federal government).
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enforcement mechanisms, and the U.S. has effectively only provided
access.
4.2.2. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act as a Violation of the
GPA
The statutory bar to private actions is a violation of the
GPA.276 Signatories agreed that aggrieved suppliers could challenge
breaches of the GPA.277 Not only was Article XX clear on its face,278
the EU279 and scholars280 also understood its language that way. It
meant what it said.
Further, Article XX was not secondary or optional. Many
considered this provision among the most important developments,
perhaps even the cornerstone of,281 the new agreement on
government procurement.282
Finally, as suggested, depriving foreign firms’ recourse is
most significant at the state and local levels as these forums lack the
procedural safeguards existing at the federal level. This is not only
significant in that it clearly violates Article XX, but also in terms of a
baleful consequence: in that foreign suppliers have little incentive to
compete for state and local markets because they lack a forum in
276 The United States failed to adopt implementing legislation consistent with
its commitments under the GPA. See GPA, Article XXIV.5.a (requiring
implementing legislation to ensure compliance of domestic laws and regulations
with the Agreement). To say that the failure to follow this provision was done with
malice aforethought would go too far. Yet the URAA’s wording “suggests a
willingness to tread close to the limit . . . and to exploit any opening left by the
agreements for protectionist interests.” Leebron, supra note 146, at 242 (emphasis
added). Cf. Leebron, supra text accompanying note 233 (quoting earlier passages
from Leebron’s article where he describes the United States’ “minimalist” and “wait
and see” approach in the URAA).
277 See WTO Agreement, supra note 16, at Article XX (setting out the guidelines
for challenge procedures).
278 Id.; see also note 246, supra, for the full text.
279 See supra note 160 (the European regulations are in compliance with GPA
Article XX).
280 See supra notes 161–162 (explaining the language of Article XX).
281 The author is indebted to conversations with Johannes Schnitzer for this
observation.
282 See supra notes 150–153 (noting major changes to the GPA because of the
article XX provision minus a few exceptions).
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which to enforce their rights and challenge discrimination. Thus,
competition suffers.
4.2.3. The EU’s Priorities During the Revised GPA and TTIP
Negotiations
One lesson to be drawn from the GPA, Revised GPA, and TTIP
negotiations is that “the more things change, the more they are the
same.”283 During the Revised GPA negotiations, the transatlantic
debate once again centered on coverage, particularly on sub-central
coverage.284 Also, for a third time, public procurement and subcentral coverage are central features in the TTIP debate.285 The last
two decades have shown that the EU has consistently demanded
equal access to U.S. markets in exchange for any concessions. This
suggests the EU is responding to pressure from persistent political
constituencies.286 So one would expect similar demands as TTIP
negotiations continue.287 To the extent EU negotiators share the
contention that there is link between meaningful access to markets
and coverage, the United States’ bar on private causes of action may

283 This is a translation of a saying attributed to French novelist Alphonse Karr,
“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS BY SUBJECT 72 (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 2d ed. 2010).
284 See supra text accompanying notes 216-222 (describing the revised GPA
negotiations).
285 See, e.g., supra notes 67-68 (explaining that the EU will focus on sub-central
coverage in the TTIP debate).
286 See Yukins & Schooner, supra note 19, at 565-67 (describing the role of
various constituencies in “influenc[ing]” and “skew[ing]” the “the political
decision-making process”).
287 This Article’s observations about the status of the TTIP negotiations should
be taken with a grain of salt. This endeavor necessarily involves a degree of
speculation because of the lack of transparency about the negotiations. See, e.g.,
TTIP Papers Published as EU Ombudsman Demands More Transparency, (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/
ttip-papers-published-euombudsman-demands-more-transparency-311088l. But see Glen Moody, European
Commission Announces Major Transparency Initiative For TAFTA/TTIP, TechDirt, (Jan.
8, 2015), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 20150107/07102529619/europeancommission-announces-major-transparency-initiative-taftattip.shtml (detailing the
European Commission’s newfound commitment to making TTIP negations more
transparent).
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prove a significant obstacle.288 Set against the backdrop of already
“floundering” negotiations, this could be even more significant.289
5. CONCLUSION
To bring this full circle, this Article has discussed a statutory bar
to private actions. Private actions are among the most important
safeguards in the GPA. Yet the United States chose to opt out of this
provision, without bothering to advise its partners that it had done
so.
Much is at stake. Public procurement is among Europe’s top four
priorities in TTIP negotiations, and wanting access to U.S. subcentral procurement markets has been a recurring theme in
negotiations with the United States for three decades. The failure to
provide a forum in which to challenge violations of the GPA is
tantamount to a coverage issue because without such a forum
foreign suppliers’ rights are inadequately protected, especially at
the state and local level where bid challenge procedures vary
widely.
If European negotiators finally recognize the full
significance of the statutory bar and United States does not

288 EU negotiators may be frustrated with the United States’ half-hearted
efforts as the European Court of Justice has mandated compliance with Article XX
and reforms were implemented in Greece and Germany more than a decade ago.
See ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 403 n. 145 (citing Aris Georgopoulos, The
System of Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules in Greece: A Critical
Overview, 9 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 75 (2000); Birgit Spiesshofer & Mathias Lang,
The New German Public Procurement Law: Commentary and English Translation of the
Text, 8 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 103 (1999)).
289 See generally Ships That Pass in the Night, supra note 44, at 57 (listing various
EU objections that range from concerns that it would “allow America
multinationals to undercut tough European standards” to worries that it would
force American factory processed chlorine-soaked chicken (Chlorhünhnchen) “down
European throats”); see also “We Can’t Protect Every Sausage” Says German Agriculture
Minister Over TTIP Deal, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.dw.de/wecant-protect-every-sausage-says-german-agriculture-minister-over-ttip-deal/a18169728 (reporting on Germany’s Agriculture Minister’s advocacy of the TTIP in
the face of criticism by those wanting to preserve specialty food’s protected titles);
Pasty Peril! TTIP Threatens Cornwall’s £300m Meat Pastry Trade, RT, http://rt.com/
uk/220243-ttip-cornish-pasty-threaten/ (describing trade unions’ opposition based
on claims that TTIP will undermine UK food safety standards).
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capitulate, this could be a deal breaker.290 Prudence counsels in
favor of amending the law for at least four reasons.
First, if America is perceived as not having honored previous
commitments, there will be hell to pay at subsequent negotiations –
and not only with Europe.291 Reputations matter.
Second, the cost of opening the federal forum to private actions
would probably be minimal. The GAO’s and COFC’s dockets are
not currently overwhelmed with disappointed foreign firms. And
since the federal system, for the most part, meets or exceeds the
GPA’s standards, it is unlikely that the volume of protests would
increase by much if foreign firms could complain about violations
of the GPA. The delta would be small.
Third, savings at the state and local level would offset the costs.
Admittedly, at the state and local level, where there are fewer
safeguards and less transparency, the costs of providing a forum for
complaints about GPA violations would be higher. Yet in the long
run such costs would be offset by efficiency gains from subjecting
these stagnant buyers to the rigors of competition. Because states
and local governments almost certainly overpay for what they buy,
liberalizing these markets could save them tens of billions if not
more,292 which would more than repay the added cost of providing
290 Arrowsmith observes that a common objection to “the provision of national
remedies for enforcing WTO law is that this may result in the unequal application
of WTO law, because of national differences in the effectiveness of the review
procedures[.]” ARROWSMITH (2003), supra note 15, at 404. This Article identifies a
particular version of that objection – namely, that the EU could justifiably complain
about the United States’ substandard compliance with Article XX.
The
counterargument is that uneven and sometimes weak enforcement is the price of
encouraging wide membership and this arrangement is probably justified. Id. at
404-05. As Arrowsmith later explains, “the less the agreement interferes with
national discretion, the more likely it is that states will accept an enforcement
regime.” Id. at 466. Thus, it is possible that the EU has done the math and decided
that having an imperfect and unequal free trade agreement with the United States
is better than having none at all.
291 If the United States gains a reputation for failing to honor its commitments,
problems may arise with any number of prospective negotiations. For example, in
addition to TTIP, this could affect the United States’ position in larger Doha Round
negotiations, as well as in the pending TPP negotiations. See note 38, supra (listing
other Trans-Pacific treaties that may be endangered if the United States gains a
reputation for not honoring its commitments).
292 If international competition lowered prices by just 10 percent, state and
local governments would save in the neighborhood of $192 billion each year. See
supra note 63 (estimating state and local spending at $1.92 trillion).
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private parties with a forum through which to challenge GPA
violations.
Finally, the United States’ foreign policy and national security
interests benefit from broader ties with NATO allies.293 Russia’s
belligerence in the Ukraine and threats to allies on NATO’s eastern
periphery have sharpened minds globally about the ongoing
importance of this alliance.294
The decade-long support in
Afghanistan, rendered by NATO allies, also aided in this. Fostering
trade ties of corresponding depths would enrich both sides and
further their mutually beneficial relationship.295
This Article has suggested that the passage of the URAA,
perhaps inadvertently, may have created at least a perception of
duplicity. To ensure that the past failures to fully implement its
GPA obligations does not interfere with TTIP negotiations,
Congress should consider passing a bill that would eliminate the bar
on private actions under the GPA.296 It should do so in haste, not
293 Of course, not all NATO members are EU members, or vice versa. But there
is a rough correlation between them, which is close enough for purposes of the
point being made here.
294 See, e.g., NATO: All for One, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2014, at 15–16 (describing
Russia’s aggressiveness toward the Baltics and other countries on NATO’s eastern
periphery, and calling for NATO action).
295 Frequently, trade relationships and shared national security interests are
reciprocal. See Tom Donilon, The National-Security Case for Free Trade, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 2011, at A19 (advocating a free-trade agreement with South Korea, and
making the case for the link between trade relationships and national security
interests by listing several countries where free-trade agreements have advanced
U.S. national security interests). See also Ships That Pass in the Night, supra note 44,
at 57 (reporting that some favor TTIP as it would “cement the transatlantic
relationship just as Europeans are getting twitchy about Russia” and create an
“economic NATO”).
296 It may be tempting to suggest that if Congress will not pass such a bill that
the President should act unilaterally. The President does have authority to waive
certain trade laws under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA). See 19 U.S.C. §
2511(a) (authorizing the President to waive any otherwise applicable “law,
regulation, procedure or practice regarding Government procurement that would .
. . . [accord foreign products] less favorable treatment than that” given to domestic
products); CIBINIC, NASH & YUKINS, supra note 252, at 1624-26 (explaining that the
application of the Buy American Act was waived pursuant to an executive order);
1 MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. § 9:25 (J. Eugene Marans, et al., eds.,
3d ed. 2013) (explaining that originally TAA was for GATT negotiations, but that
was later extended to cover the GPA, NAFTA, and the various bilateral trade); W.
NOEL KEYES, GOV’T CONT. UNDER FED. ACQUISITION REG. § 25.3 (2013) (explaining the
application of the TAA to the Federal Acquisitions Regulations). Grier explains that
the TAA cannot be extended to new laws. She notes that the “American Recovery
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only for the sake of the transatlantic economies directly affected, but
also for the welfare of the world economy as a whole which would
stand to gain from a wealthier America and Europe. It would be a
pity for such an important free-trade agreement to founder on such
a small issue – especially one so easily remedied.

and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) illustrates that the TAA does not apply to
new domestic purchasing restrictions.” See Jean Heilman Grier, Trade Agreements
Act of 1979:
Broad Agreement, Narrow Application (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=559. Further, the authority the TAA grants to the
President extends only to waiving buying restrictions. Since waiving portions of
the implementation legislation in order to facilitate compliance with the GPA
would affirmatively create a private cause of action, this would be contrary to
Congress’s express intent in the URAA. Therefore, that would clearly be more than
what Congress had intended for the TAA in 1979 or as subsequently amended.
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